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1.  Robert E. Litan 
U.S. Financial Markets and Institutions in the 1980s: 
A Decade of Turbulence 
The U.S. financial system suffered its greatest shocks in the 1980s since the 
Depression. Not since the 1930s did so many commercial banks and savings 
and loan associations fail. Because most of the deposits at these institutions 
were federally insured, the federal government will spend hundreds of billions 
of dollars during the next several decades cleaning up the wreckage. 
The securities markets, too, experienced their share of turmoil. After rising 
more or less consistently for five  straight years, the stock market plunged 
deeply between August and October 1987 and then dropped sharply again in 
October 1989. As the decade came to a close, the newly developed junk bond 
market collapsed, although at this writing it has substantially recovered. 
The 1980s were not marked solely by  disaster, however. The decade saw 
many innovations and success stories. Whole new  financial instruments and 
markets developed at an almost breathtaking pace: asset-backed securities, 
variable rate mortgages, financial futures, to name just a few. While at the 
beginning of the decade many of the nation’s largest banks were struggling, by 
the end new “superregional”  banks seemingly came from nowhere to challenge 
the once dominant “money centers” for U.S. banking supremacy. Perhaps most 
surprising, all the financial troubles had little impact on the “real” economy. 
Indeed, as bank and thrift failures mounted, and despite the October 1987 
crash, the economy marched upward, finishing the decade by  marking the 
longest peacetime economic expansion in the nation’s history. 
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As in earlier eras, policy-making toward financial markets and institutions 
in the 1980s was driven largely by  crisis. Nevertheless, the remedies that put 
out the immediate fires, especially those that raged among depository institu- 
tions, have had significant longer-run consequences. 
Not all crises during the decade triggered a policy response. For example, 
Congress took no action on “reform” suggestions advanced by  a special ad- 
ministration task force convened to study the causes of the October 1987 stock 
market crash. 
In addition, not all policy actions during the decade responded to crises. 
While Congress was deadlocked over the issues of interstate banking and fi- 
nancial product-line deregulation (or “restructuring”), many states filled the 
vacuum by legislating in each of these areas. Similarly, federal regulators took 
various steps under existing law to better adapt the financial framework to on- 
going market developments. Finally, toward the end of the decade, bank regu- 
lators in the major industrialized countries launched an ambitious effort to put 
bank regulation in these countries on a common footing, a step that may fore- 
shadow future international cooperative regulatory initiatives on other finan- 
cial and, perhaps, nonfinancial issues. 
This chapter attempts to make some sense out of these and other events and 
developments. Given the broad scope of the U.S. financial services industry 
and the limited space here in which to consider it, it concentrates only on de- 
pository institutions and securities markets. This limited focus means that 
other important developments affecting financial markets or institutions, such 
as the crisis in property-casualty insurance in the mid- 1980s, must be ignored. 
The discussion begins with some brief background information on the U.S. 
financial system that is relevant for understanding the important developments 
in financial markets and institutions during the 1980s. The chapter then de- 
scribes those developments, both episodic and structural, noting how federal 
policy-makers responded (or didn’t  respond) to each. Specifically, why did 
Congress react to at least some of the crises in the depository industry but take 
no action following the stock market crashes of  1987 and 1989? Similarly, 
what accounts for the failure by Congress to address in a meaningful fashion 
the important structural weaknesses in the U.S. financial system, despite sev- 
eral opportunities to do so? 
Answers to these questions provide a useful transition to the third section of 
the chapter, which identifies what alternative courses of action could have been 
taken and why they weren’t. The concluding section briefly draws out several 
implications and lessons from the earlier analysis. To  be sure, the policy dis- 
cussions  on  financial institutions  and  markets  in  the  1990s are  likely  to 
be focused on a different set of questions than those that preoccupied policy- 
makers’ attention in the 1980s; one key difference is that policymakers will be 
paying more attention to international issues in this decade than they did in the 
one just past. However, precisely for this reason, there should be opportunities 
in the 1990s for breaking many of the policy stalemates of the 1980s. 521  Financial Regulation 
8.1  Background 
Depository institutions and securities markets carry out the same important 
function in a market economy: both channel the surplus funds of  savers to 
deficit-spending consumers and to firms that have investment opportunities in 
excess of their retained earnings. Commercial banks and thrift institutions ac- 
complish intermediation directly by collecting deposits, some used for trans- 
actional purposes (checking accounts) and most for savings, and lending the 
funds to businesses and individuals. By exploiting economies of scale in evalu- 
ating and monitoring borrowers, both types of  depositories direct funds be- 
tween large classes of savers and borrowers far more cheaply than if  these 
individuals and firms attempted to find each other themselves. 
Securities markets perform intermediation services more cheaply still, but, 
until recently, only for commercial borrowers of  sufficient size and credit- 
worthiness to be able to sell their debt and equity on the open market. Unlike 
individual loans provided by depositories, securities are commodities and can 
be readily traded as such. Securities markets, whether organized exchanges or 
informal trading networks, provide the settings that allow these trades to take 
place. Accordingly, they make it possible not only for individuals  to participate 
directly in the intermediation  process but also for other financial institutions- 
insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds-to  purchase and sell 
securities and thus to perform intermediation services as well. 
As the nation entered the 1980s, most of the regulatory apparatus that gov- 
erned the depository and securities industries was inherited, and little changed, 
from the  1930s. Depression-era legislation created the  Securities and  Ex- 
change Commission (SEC), registration requirements for securities dealers, 
and regular reporting and disclosure requirements for companies whose stocks 
and bonds are traded in public markets. In 1940, Congress added legislation 
governing the operation of investment companies, now commonly known as 
mutual funds. The securities acts were designed principally to ensure that buy- 
ers and sellers of securities are fully informed of all relevant information at the 
time they make their trades. 
The Depression-era legislation for depository institutions had different pur- 
poses. At the time, of course, the principal national concern was restoring con- 
fidence in a banking system that experienced approximately 9,000 failures be- 
tween 1930 and 1933 and a series of deposit runs. Perhaps the most important 
response was the creation of federal deposit insurance, first for bank accounts 
up to $2,500 (1933), then for thrift accounts up to $5,000 (in 1934, with the 
ceiling for bank accounts raised at the same time). The deposit insurance ceil- 
ings were raised intermittently  in succeeding decades, reaching $40,000 by the 
end of the 1970s. Significantly,  there has been no nationwide deposit run since 
federal insurance was introduced, although, as I discuss below, many experts 
believe that federal insurance in turn led to a whole new set of problems during 
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Congress also responded to the banking crisis of the 1930s by  segmenting 
depository institutions from the securities markets and other financial interme- 
diaries. In particular, the Glass-Steagall  Act of 1933 separated commercial and 
investment banking largely in response to allegations at the time that banks 
had abused their securities powers to cause undue losses to other banks and 
customers.1  A little more than two decades later, Congress extended the seg- 
mentation of depositories by enacting the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
(amended in 1970), which limited organizations that own banks to a narrow 
range of  nonbanking activities that are “closely related to banking.” Similar 
provisions were enacted during the 1960s for companies that own more than 
one thrift institution.* 
The bank and thrift holding company restrictions have been justified, in part, 
as a means for insulating depositories and the federal insurance funds from 
nonbanking risks. But fear of “bigness” has also played a significant role in 
bank and thrift regulation. Congress traditionally has not been willing to per- 
mit the development of Japanese-style zaibatsu bawnonbank conglomerates 
in the United States. Quite the contrary, Congress has endeavored to protect 
small depository institutions from competitors within the same industry. In 
legislation enacted before and since the Depression, Congress has prohibited 
depositories and their parent companies from crossing state lines without the 
permission of  individual states (permission that no  state granted until the 
1970s). The Banking Act of 1933 (of which the Glass-Steagall  Act was a part) 
also established ceilings (Regulation Q) on interest rates payable on bank de- 
posits (which were extended to thrift deposits in 1966) largely in order to limit 
competition among banks. Indeed, although deposit insurance was justified 
primarily  as a means of  protecting the banking  system from runs, it was 
strongly advocated by small banks in particular, which saw insurance as a cru- 
cial vehicle for preventing their depositors from migrating to larger banks. 
Depository institutions have been segmented not only from other types of 
financial intermediaries  but also from each other. Different charters and regula- 
tory systems for commercial banks and thrifts, for example, have traditionally 
separated bank lending for businesses, and more recently for consumers, from 
thrift lending for residential mortgages. Although the different types of deposi- 
tories responded to very different needs and thus arose in response to market 
developments (Litan 1987b, 12-19),  legislation dating from the Depression 
has encouraged the development of thrift institutions in particular (through tax 
incentives and a government-backed secondary market for mortgage loans, 
among other things) in order to promote home ownership. 
1. Recent scholarship, however, has discredited the validity of many of the allegations about 
bank  abuses in  the  securities business before  the  Glass-Steagall Act  was  passed (see Benston 
1990a). 
2. Unitary thrift holding companies-those  owning a single thrift-have  been exempt from the 
affiliation limitations applicable to multithrift holding companies. During the 198Os, a number of 
nonfinancial firms exploited this “loophole” to acquire thrifts. 523  Financial Regulation 
Although it was not free from difficulty, by  at least several measures the 
Depression-era financial structure worked reasonably well through the 1970s. 
The bank and thrift failure rate fell dramatically after deposit insurance was 
introduced. For example, from the end of World War I1 through 1979, rarely 
did more than 10 banks rail in any single year. Indeed, as shown in table 8.1, 
even during the volatile 1970s, marked especially by the 1973 and 1979 “oil 
price shocks,” the bank and thrift failure rate was remarkably low. 
By other measures, the securities markets were also performing as could 
reasonably be expected. Despite many ups and downs in price movements, 
the nation’s  securities markets steadily became more efficient in processing 
transactions. Between 1960 and 1979, for example, annual stock trading vol- 
ume on the New York  Stock Exchange (NYSE) jumped more than tenfold, 
from 766 million to 8.3 billion. Similarly, a whole new over-the-counter market 
linked by computers-NASDAQ-developed  to handle trades in companies 
Table 8.1  Financial Health of U.S. Depository Institutions, 1970-89 
Thrift Institutions  Commercial  Banks  Economywide Data 
Failures1  Failures1  Failuresl  ROE 





















10  2.2 
4  .9 
2  .5 
5  1.2 
1  .2 
11  2.2 
12  2.5 
10  2.1 
4  .9 
4  .9 
32  6.9 
82  19.1 
247  64.6 
70  20.0 
36  10.6 
64  20.0 
80  26.0 
77  26.5 
233  92.2 
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4.4  9.3 
4.2  9.7 
3.8  10.6 
3.6  12.8 
3.8  14.9 
4.3  11.6 
3.5  13.9 
2.8  14.2 
2.4  15.0 
2.8  16.4 
4.2  13.9 
6.1  13.6 
8.9  9.2 
11.0  10.6 
10.7  12.5 
11.5  10.1 
12.0  9.5 
10.2  12.8 
9.8  16.1 
N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: Kane (1989);  Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years); Economic Report 
of the President (1990); Office of Thrift Supervision; Resolution Trust Corporation;  FDIC (1988). 
Note: ROE = return on equity. N.A. = not available. 
“Only those failures resolved by the FSLIC or RTC. Data for the years 1970-74  and 1989 provided 
by  the Office for Thrift Supervision; 1976-88  data taken from Kane (1989). 
bIncludes  only failed thrifts resolved during the year. At year end 1989, another 281 thrifts were 
in conservatorship,  and hundreds more were waiting to be placed in conservatorship. 524  Robert E. Litan 
Table 8.2  Share of Financial Assets Held by Major Intermediaries 
Intermediary  1946  1950  1960  1970  1980  1985  1989 
Commercial banks 
Savings and loans 










57.3  51.2  38.2  38.6  36.8  33.3  30.9 
4.3  5.7  11.8  12.8  15.2  14.9  11.8 
8.0  7.7  6.9  5.9  4.3  3.1  2.8 
.2  .3  1.1  1.3  1.7  1.9  2.1 
20.3  21.4  19.4  15.0  11.5  11.1  12.1 
1  .5  2.4  6.4  8.4  11.7  11.9  12.0 
1.2  1.7  3.3  4.5  4.9  5.7  7.0 
3.0  4.0  4.4  3.7  4.3  4.1  4.7 
2.1  3.2  4.6  4.8  5.0  5 .o  5 .0 
.6  1.1  2.9  3.5  3.4  6.8  9.4 
1.5  1.4  1.1  1.5  1.2  2.3  2.3 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, flow of funds accounts 
not listed on either the NYSE or other major stock exchanges. Trading in the 
securities markets was given a strong boost in the early and mid-1970s when, 
after vigorous prodding by the Justice Department’s antitrust division, the SEC 
and the Congress dismantled the system of fixed brokerage commissions estab- 
lished by the NYSE. This step was also encouraged by the growing importance 
of  institutional investors and traders in the markets who were gradually de- 
serting the NYSE and instead trading directly among themselves or on regional 
exchanges. In turn, the growth in the securities markets facilitated the rise of 
certain  nonbank  financial  intermediaries-notably  pension  funds,  finance 
companies, and mutual funds-which,  as table 8.2 demonstrates, substantially 
increased their share of the nation’s financial assets. 
Nevertheless, several cracks in the post-Depression financial system had al- 
ready become evident by the 1970s, if not before, and were to become much 
more visible during the 1980s. Dating from the 1950s, the FDIC consistently 
arranged mergers of failed banks instead of paying off their depositors and thus 
effectively guaranteed in full deposit accounts above the statutory insurance 
ceilings. This policy became explicit when the FDIC protected all deposits at 
Franklin National Bank in 1974, the largest bank failure up to that time since 
World War 11. By stretching the federal safety net on an ad hoc basis in re- 
sponse to  various crises, bank  regulators undermined  depositor discipline 
against excessive risk taking by banks and thrifts, a development the conse- 
quences of which would show up vividly in the 198Os.l 
By the end of  the 1970s, market developments also were adding strain to the 
compartmentalized financial structure (Pierce 1991). Advances in computer 
3. For an excellent history of  the FDIC’s  response to bank crises in the postwar period, see 
Sprague (1985). 525  Financial Regulation 
technology in the 1960s and 1970s permitted competition to develop in the 
core depository and lending services provided by banks and thrifts, which, as 
discussed later, had powerful effects in the following decade. For example, the 
new processing technologies made it possible for money market mutual funds 
to offer individuals limited transaction services on accounts yielding higher 
rates of  interest than the Regulation Q interest ceilings that applied to bank 
and thrift deposits. In response, during the 1970s, regulators began lifting the 
interest ceilings for large depositors, a trend that was to accelerate in the 1980s. 
Similarly, on the lending side, computer technology facilitated the growth 
of the commercial paper market, which highly rated corporations used to raise 
funds directly rather than borrowing from banks. Ultimately more significant, 
advances in data processing made it possible for quasi-governmental financing 
agencies and private investment banks to “securitize” mortgage instruments by 
packaging them into bundles and then to distribute units of the resulting trusts 
to individual investors, nonbank financial institutions (pension funds, mutual 
funds, and insurance companies), as well as to depositories. By turning for- 
merly illiquid loans into tradable commodities, the securitization process was 
gradually undermining the economic rationale for depository institutions as 
specialized evaluators and monitors of credit; markets instead were performing 
that 
Finally, the 1970s were the last years when it could be safely said that U.S. 
financial institutions and markets were dominant in global financial markets. 
As the decade ended, corporate shares traded on U.S. stock markets still ac- 
counted for over half of market capitalization of shares traded on worldwide 
stock markets; European and Japanese stock markets were far behind (OTA 
1990, 25). Similarly, although U.S. banks had been steadily losing ground in 
the international size rankings, table 8.3 illustrates that, by  the end of  the 
1970s, the United States still had two of the world’s top ten banks and six of the 
top fifty. Most of these larger banks were active competitors in foreign markets. 
All this was to change in the 1980s. That the federal safety net extended to 
all bank and thrift deposits-at  least those at the largest depositories-was  to 
be made even more explicit. The franchise values of  commercial bank and 
thrift charters were to be much further diminished by nonbank competition, 
securitization in particular. More important, solvency problems among deposi- 
tories, especially among thrifts, were to become more severe than at any time 
since the Depression and the costs imposed on the federal government of re- 
solving them were to reach unparalleled heights. U.S. security markets would 
be further revolutionized by new markets and instruments. And U.S. financial 
institutions and markets would find themselves under much greater competi- 
tive pressure from foreign institutions both at home and abroad. 
4. The impact of securitization on the thrift and banking industries is also discussed in greater 
detail below. 526  Robert E. Litan 
Table 8.3  Nationality of the World’s Largest Banks by Deposit Size 
Number of  Banks in Top 10  Number of Banks in Top 50 
Country  1956  1960  1970  1979  1988  1956  1960  1970  1979  1988 
United States  5  6  4  2  0251913 6  2 
UnitedKingdom  3  3  2  2  0  7  5  4  4  4 
Canada  2110065541 
France  0014033344 
Germany  0012003477 
Italy  0010035421 
Japan  10  3  8  11  16  25 
Australia  11100 
Netherlands  00132 
Switzerland  00333 
Other  21101 
Belgium  00010 
Source: Benston (199Ob). 
8.2  Key Events and Policies of the 1980s 
The reaction of policymakers to the varied events of the 1980s was highly 
uneven. As in earlier periods, federal authorities tended to move only when a 
crisis forced them to do so. This was not the case, however, with certain state 
legislatures, which reacted (perhaps without knowing so) to basic structural 
developments. Accordingly, in reviewing the key financial events and policies 
of the 1980s,  it is essential to distinguish the crises from the important, but less 
well-recognized, structural trends. 
8.2.1  The Crises 
All three segments of the U.S. financial system reviewed in this chapter- 
thrift institutions, banks, and securities markets-experienced  severe shocks 
during the 1980s. Table 8.4 lists the key crises in chronological order, together 
with a brief description of the policy responses. As highlighted in the table, 
Congress reacted only to certain crises; regulators (principally the Federal Re- 
serve) handled the others. In all cases, however, the immediate responses have 
had significant longer-run consequences. 
Thrifts 
The three crises that rocked the thrift industry during the 1980s had the most 
significant immediate (if not permanent) economic impact and thus deserve 
the most attention. 
The initial thrift crisis occurred as the decade opened. Its origins are well 
known and stem from the Federal Reserve’s vigorous program of  monetary 
restraint launched in late 1979 to attack double-digit  inflation. The Fed’s efforts 527  Financial Regulation 
Table 8.4  Financial Crisis of the 1980s 









Market value insolvency among 
thrifts 
LDC debt crisis 
Continental Illinois failure 
Thrift deposit runs in Ohio and 
Stock market crash 
Second stage of thrift disaster 
Maryland 
A lesser stock market decline 
Collapse of junk bond market 
Deposit interest deregulation;  broader 
thrift powers; higher deposit 
insurance ceiling; relaxed 
supervision 
Fed-coordinated  new bank lending 
Regulatory protection of uninsured 
depositors (“too big to fail”) 
Freezing of accounts; Fed discount 
window lending 
Fed discount window lending 
Federal cleanup effort launched; 
tighter capital standards 
No response 
No response 
in  the short run produced some of  the highest nominal interest rates in the 
nation’s history. By March 1980, short-term Treasury bills were yielding more 
than  15 percent, providing depositors with strong incentives to move funds 
from their regulated bank and thrift accounts paying interest no higher than 5.5 
percent to money market mutual funds (MMFs), which invested principally in 
U.S. government  obligation^.^ With little chance that interest rates would soon 
fall dramatically, the nation’s banks and thrifts faced a dangerous threat to the 
stability of their deposit bases that both the administration and the Congress 
clearly recognized. 
But one obvious solution-instant  and complete deregulation  of deposit in- 
terest rate ceilings-also  posed a danger of its own, especially for thrift institu- 
tions whose assets consisted primarily of fixed-rate, long-term mortgages but 
whose liabilities could be repriced within a much shorter period. For these 
institutions, deregulation of deposit interest rates when market rates were well 
above the prevailing ceilings would increase funding costs much more rapidly 
than earnings from investments. Since thrifts were locked into earning low- 
interest rates on their existing stock of mortgage loans, deregulation could ex- 
pose them to many years of losses until they acquired a sufficient volume of 
new, higher-yielding mortgage loam6 
Congress and the administration  attempted in 1980 to avoid both dangers- 
deposit runs under the current regulatory regime and continuing losses under 
5.  In fact, assets held in MMFs jumped from just $12 billion in January 1979 to $61 billion in 
March 1980 (Economic Report of the President, 1981 and 1982). 
6. Of course, this would not have occurred had Congress deregulated deposit interest rates in 
the early  1970s when urged to do so by the Hunt Commission. If  deregulation had been imple- 
mented much earlier, thrifts would have had much higher-yielding  mortgages in their portfolios in 
the early 1980s when interest rates soared. 528  Robert E. Litan 
deregulation-by  compromising. In March  1980, the president signed into 
law  the  Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and  Monetary  Control  Act 
(DIDMCA) of 1980, which established a committee to phase out deposit inter- 
est ceilings over the next six years. To  encourage depositors not to leave their 
institutions in the interim, and to mollify thrifts concerned about the adverse 
impact of  interest deregulation on their costs of  funds, during a conference 
committee session Congress added provisions increasing the deposit insurance 
ceiling on thrift and bank accounts from $40,000 to $100,000.7 In addition, 
to provide other revenue sources for thrifts beyond fixed-rate mortgages, the 
DIDMCA also permitted federally chartered thrifts to invest a limited portion 
of their assets in consumer loans.* 
Federal thrift regulators also took advantage of  several other features of 
DIDMCA to enhance the economic viability of the thrift industry in an envi- 
ronment of  partial deposit interest deregulation. In  1981, the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board authorized federal thrifts to offer the equivalent of interest- 
paying  checking  accounts,  or  negotiable-order-of-withdrawal (NOW)  ac- 
counts, which by  then a number of  states had already authorized for their 
thrifts. In an effort to reduce the industry’s exposure to wide swings in interest 
rates, the Board permitted federally chartered thrifts to extend adjustable-rate 
mortgages. 
Although well intentioned, these various measures could not stop either the 
hemorrhaging of deposits or red ink from the thrift industry, given continued 
double-digit market interest rates. Thus, with only modest deregulation of in- 
terest rates on larger deposit accounts, thrifts continued to lose smaller deposits 
to money market funds; in 1981 and 1982, deposit withdrawals at thrifts ex- 
ceeded new deposits by $32 billion (Brumbaugh 1988, 39).9  At the same time, 
by  paying higher interest rates to keep their large-dollar deregulated deposits, 
most thrifts had no choice but to suffer continued operating losses. As shown 
in table 5, 85 percent of all thrifts operating in 1981 lost money; that figure fell 
to “only” 68 percent in 1982. 
As thrift deposit outflows and operating losses mounted, Congress acted 
again.1° In December 1982, Congress enacted the Garn-St  Germain Deposi- 
7. Although the increase in the insurance ceiling has since been criticized as an example of 
“midnight” congressional decision making, according to one knowledgeable source who was pres- 
ent at the critical conference committee session, the FDIC’s authorized representative reported that 
the FDIC’s acting chairman, Irvine  Sprague, did not object to the increase during a telephone 
conversation at the time. Sprague has not since explicitly refuted these events, but he also claims 
to have communicated that his agency had consistently been against the $lOO,OOO figure (Sprague 
1990, 19). 
8. The DIDMCA had many other provisions. Among them were provisions extending reserve 
requirements to hanks and thrifts that were not formal members of the Federal Reserve System. 
9. Total deposits at thrifts nevertheless rose, owing solely to interest credited on accounts that 
remained in thrifts (Brumbaugh 1988,40). 
10. By the end of  1982, assets at the MMFs had grown to more than $200 billion-nearly  ten 
times larger than just three years before-and  threatened to draw still more deposits from both 
thrifts and banks. 529  Financial Regulation 
Table 8.5  Profitability of the Thrift Industry, 1980-89 
Number as a % 
of  All Thrifts 
Assets as a % of 





































Source: White (1991). 
tory Institutions Act, which accelerated deposit interest deregulation by  au- 
thorizing banks and thrifts to offer deposit instruments directly competitive 
with the MMFs: “money market deposit accounts” with minimum balances of 
only $2,500. The act also enhanced thrifts’ asset diversification authority by 
increasing the asset limit for consumer loans and by  allowing federally char- 
tered thrifts to extend commercial real estate mortgages as well as ordinary 
business loans. 
Regulators moved as well, principally by weakening the financial require- 
ments for new entrants and existing owners. This process began in 1980 when 
the Board lowered the minimum capital requirement for thrifts from 5 percent 
of  assets to 4 percent, a step that was authorized by  DIDMCA. The Board 
effectively diluted capital requirements much further the following year by 
adopting various changes in thrift accounting for regulatory purposes to make 
thrifts look healthier than they appeared under “generally accepted accounting 
principles” (GAAP).” 
The seemingly technical differences in accounting treatment had very sig- 
nificant impacts. As shown in table 8.6, the industry’s capital-to-asset ratio 
during the early 1980s (and later) was consistently higher under the Board’s 
“regulatory accounting principles” (RAP) than it was under GAAP. However, 
even GAAP overstated the industry’s true financial condition. If goodwill and 
other intangible assets were properly excluded from net worth, the industry 
barely had any “tangible” capital. And, when the industry’s assets and liabili- 
ties were valued at their market value, the industry was clearly insolvent-by 
11. Among other things, thrifts were allowed to spread their losses when they sold low interest- 
bearing mortgages over the remaining lives of those mortgages; to book as income large up-front 
fees for originating new mortgages; and to count as capita1 for regulatory purposes the “net worth 
certificates” that the Board issued to many thrifts in exchange for offsetting promissory notes. 530  Robert E. Litan 
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Total 
Assets 
GAAP Net  Tangible Net 
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% of Total  of Total 
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5.26  5.23 
4.15  3.91 
2.95  .54 
3.14  .47 
2.86  .4 1 
3.15  .81 
3.41  1.33 
-  12.47 
-  17.32 





Source: Brumbaugh (1988, 50) 
Note:  N.A. =  not available. 
more than $100 billion, even according to the chairman of the Bank Board at 
the time (Pratt 1989; see also Carron 1982b). 
Why would regulators deliberately go to such lengths in effect to hide and 
ignore the financial condition of  the institutions they  supervised? One im- 
portant answer lies in the limited resources of  the thrift insurance fund, the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). As illustrated in 
table 8.7, with less than $7 billion in reserves in the early 1980s, the FSLIC 
could close only a relative handful of the insolvent thrifts, which it in fact did 
(see table 8.1 above). However, as table 8.8 indicates, the number of  RAP- 
insolvent thrifts, and the assets that they controlled, was substantially  less than 
the number of insolvent institutions  measured on a more realistic tangible capi- 
tal basis. 
Regulators had another reason for adopting and encouraging the use of more 
liberal thrift accounting methods. Even as market interest rates headed toward 
record levels, it was widely expected among policymakers and legislators that 
the high-interest environment would  be temporary: rates eventually would 
come down and thus restore the thrifts to their pre-1980 healthy condition. On 
this view, RAP could be (and was) justified as a temporary device to tide the 
industry over until it (inevitably)  recovered. 
The prevailing optimism was as convenient as it was necessary. Faced with 
steeply rising federal deficits at the time, neither the Reagan administration 
nor the Congress was  willing to authorize the more than $100 billion that 
would then have been required to close all thrifts insolvent on a market-value 
basis. Not only would such a radical step have been extraordinarily expensive, 
but it almost certainly would have been politically infeasible, given the politi- 
cal power at the time of the thrift industry and its allies (primarily the housing 
industry) in Congress. Clearly, if the industry could be restored to health sim- 531  Financial Regulation 
Table 8.7  Reserves of FSLIC and FDIC (Millions of Dollars and Percents) 
FSLIC  FDIC 

































































































Sources: Kane (1989); FDIC (1988). 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
Table 8.8  Numbers and Assets of Insolvent and Weakly Capitalized Thrifts, 
198147 
Thrifts with Tangible 
Tangible-Insolvent  Capital below 3% 
RAP-Insolvent Thrifts”  Thriftsb  of Assets 
No.  Assets ($billion)  No.  Assets ($billion)  No.  Assets ($billion) 
1981  33  3  112  29  702  163 
1982  71  13  415  220  783  217 
1983  48  13  515  234  879  273 
1984  71  15  695  336  853  321 
1985  130  26  705  335  726  437 
1986  255  66  672  324  581  335 
1987  351  99  672  336  47 1  339 
Sources: White (1991) and Barth and Bartholomew (1990), both based on Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (FHLBB) data. 
‘Thrifts that were insolvent on the basis of regulatory accounting principles (RAP). 
bThrifts that were solvent on a RAP basis but insolvent on a tangible net worth basis. 532  Robert E. Litan 
ply with a drop in interest rates and an end to the economic downturn, why 
then shut most of it down? Moreover, Congress took action in 1980 and 1982 
to facilitate the industry's recovery by broadening its investment powers. The 
administration was so optimistic that the industry would indeed bounce back 
that it  felt comfortable reducing the examination and  supervisory staff at 
the Bank Board and thus the frequency of thrift examinations, as shown in 
table 8.9. 
In fact, some part of  the optimistic outlook for the industry proved correct. 
Beginning in 1983, the economy started to grow again, and interest rates fell 
markedly. As expected (and hoped), a good portion of the industry returned to 
profitability, and the industry's  capital improved by  all measures (table 8.6 
above). 
In  1985, however, the industry was jolted again by  its second crisis of  the 
1980s: the deposit runs on state-chartered thrifts in Ohio and Maryland follow- 
ing the failures of Home State Savings (Ohio) and Old Court Savings and Loan 
(Maryland). The runs affected only the thrifts in these states that were not 
federally insured but instead insured by state-sponsored funds. The runs were 
stopped in both states by  a combination of  actions: state-imposed limits on 
depositor withdrawals coupled with discount window lending by the Federal 
Reserve to solvent thrifts with liquidity problems. For these reasons, Congress 
saw no need to get involved. 
Still, outside Maryland and  Ohio, substantial troubles remained. As re- 
flected in table 8.8 above, the decline in interest rates did not cure the tangible 
capital insolvency of hundreds of thrifts that collectively held more than $300 
billion in assets. In addition, the table indicates that hundreds more institutions 
with even more assets were thinly capitalized. The owners and managers of 
both classes of institutions had strong incentives to take risks at the expense of 
the FSLIC by gambling with federally insured funds; if their strategies were 
wrong, the owners and managers had little or nothing to lose (the FSLIC would 
Table 8.9  FSLIC-Insured  Thrift Examinations and Examination Resources, 1980-84 
Examinations  Examinations 
and  No. of  Thrift  Examinations  per Billion 
Supervision  FSLIC-Insured  Industry  Per  Dollars of 
Staff  Examinations  Thrifts  Assets4  Thrift  Assets 
1980  1,308  3,210  3,993  593.8  0.80  5.41 
1981  1,385  3,171  3,751  639.8  0.85  4.96 
I982  1,379  2,800  3,287  686.2  0.85  4.08 
I983  1,361  2,131  3,146  813.8  0.68  2.62 
1984h  1,337  2,347  3,136  916.9  0.75  2.40 
Sources: Barth and Bradley (1989) and Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1989); both based on Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) data. 
"In billions of dollars. 
hIncludes special, limited-scope examinations. 533  Financial Regulation 
bear all remaining losses); but, if  they  were right, they  (and not the FSLIC) 
would reap all the gains.12 Various experts inside and  outside government 
called attention to the effective insolvency of the FSLIC and its exposure to 
still additional losses if insolvent thrifts then open were not closed quickly, but 
their warnings went unheeded.I3 The prevailing attitude throughout Congress 
and most of the administration was that the industry’s health would continue 
to improve with declining interest rates and a growing economy. 
By  1986, however, the administration recognized that the FSLIC did not 
have sufficient resources to close all insolvent thrifts (table 8.7 above). In an 
effort to replenish the FSLIC’s reserves, the administration  requested Congress 
to authorize a capital “infusion” of  $15 billion, financed “off budget” with 
bonds issued by a new agency to be created solely for that purpose. In fact, the 
“infusion” was primarily a borrowing by  the FSLIC against future premium 
revenues. The administration’s proposal was  opposed by  many  thrift institu- 
tions and by  various elected officials who argued that the money was both 
unnecessary and likely to be wasted by the FSLIC. Eventually, in 1987, Con- 
gress agreed on  a lower recapitalization figure of  $10.8 billion  as part  of 
broader banking legislation. 
The ink on the 1987 funding legislation was barely dry when outside ana- 
lysts warned that much more money would be necessary fully to resolve the 
thrift pr0b1em.I~  As the year ended and through 1988, the cost estimates moved 
upward. By summer of 1988, the chairman of the Bank  Board, M. Danny Wall, 
conceded to Congress that almost $40 billion over a ten-year period would be 
required, a figure that by then was far below private estimates. Yet, despite the 
mounting cost projections, the thrift issue was barely mentioned during the 
1988 presidential campaign, largely because it was  a political liability for 
both parties.15 
The third thrift crisis of the 1980s emerged after the 1988 election and was 
more political than economic. Although roughly one-third of the industry then 
was unprofitable (table 8.5 above), there was no imminent danger of a deposit 
run. Nevertheless, this last crisis was precipitated after the election by the Fed- 
12. This “moral hazard” in federal deposit insurance has been so frequently noted by so many 
economists that it is inappropriate to single out any group of scholars who have pointed it out. 
13. Economists at the Bank Board, e.g., pointed out in internal analyses in 1985 that the FSLIC 
was effectively insolvent. The chairman of the Bank Board, Edwin Gray, made the same point to 
Congress in the same year. 
14. For example, in their thorough analysis of the situation through 1986,  Brumbaugh and Car- 
ron (1987) estimated that $30 billion would have been required to close all insolvent thrifts. In 
addition, Bert Ely (a well-known independent  financial consultant) repeatedly issued cost esti- 
mates in the mid to late 1980s indicating that the FSLIC had insufficient resources to rid the thrift 
industry of all its insolvent institutions. 
15. That the problem could have grown so large during a Republican administration was clearly 
a political liability for the party’s standard bearer, George Bush. The Democrats, however, could 
be blamed for helping lower the administration’s  original $15 billion request for additional funding 
for the FSLIC. In addition, the speaker of the House, Jim Wright, was under heavy attack for, 
among other things, his close involvement with several executives and owners of insolvent thrifts. 534  Robert E. Litan 
era1 Home Loan Bank Board, which disposed of many insolvent thrifts by pro- 
viding purchasers with extensive guarantees against future losses. The guaran- 
tees enabled the Board to complete these transactions without cash, of which 
the FSLIC had very little.I6 In part, the Board rushed through its late 1988 
transactions because certain tax benefits to acquirers of thrifts were scheduled 
to expire at the end of that year, and the presidential elections were over. 
Whether or not the rush of deals was so intended, it certainly had the effect 
of  provoking both the next administration and Congress to address the thrift 
insolvency problems in a much more comprehensive and systematic fashion. 
As its first order of business, the incoming Bush administration  proposed a far- 
reaching plan to close down approximately 500 clearly insolvent thrifts over 
three years and another 200 marginal thrifts through 1999. It asked Congress 
for $50 billion, again in off-budget financing, to carry out the job; the re- 
maining $24 billion in estimated cleanup costs were to be paid by  the thrift 
industry in the form of higher deposit insurance premiums (the plan proposed 
that banks, too, would pay  higher premiums to cover the rising cost of bank 
failures). In addition, the plan proposed that a new  agency (the Resolution 
Trust Corporation, or RTC) be created to dispose of the insolvent thrifts and 
their assets; that capital standards for thrifts be raised to the equivalent of bank 
standards and that thrifts be required to return to their original mission (hous- 
ing finance) by investing at least 70 percent (up from 60 percent) to their assets 
in mortgage and consumer loans; and that the federal supervisory and regula- 
tory structure for the industry be brought inside the executive branch (the Trea- 
sury Department) rather than remain in the independent Bank Board. The ad- 
ministration’s plan left for the future-the  1990s-the  controversial questions 
surrounding the future separation of  the thrift and bank industries (and the 
regulatory apparatus that governs them) as well as the redesign of the deposit 
insurance system for both banks and thrifts. In August  1989, the Congress 
approved most of the administration’s original proposal in the Financial Institu- 
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of  1989 (FIRREA). 
Since FIRREA’s passage, the estimated costs of  resolving the third thrift 
crisis of the 1980s has risen substantially. In May  1990, the Treasury Depart- 
ment revised upward the total cost of the post-FIRREA thrift closures and as- 
sisted sales from the original present discounted cost of $74 billion to a range 
of $90-$130  billion.” Both the Congressional Budget Office and the General 
Accounting Office have projected even higher costs. 
16. In  all, the  Board disposed of 205  thrifts-179  by  funding acquisitions and  twenty-six 
through liquidations-in  1988, estimating at the time that the eventual present discounted cost to 
the federal government (including another eighteen “stabilizations”) would be $38.6 billion. 
17. The FDIC has since estimated that the present discounted cost of the pre-1989 guarantees 
on thrift disposals will exceed $50 billion, up from the $38.6 billion originally estimated by the 
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Banks 
The two major banking crises of the 1980s, fortunately, have proved to be 
far less costly than the thrift crises, at least thus far. However, unlike the thrift 
affairs, each banlung crisis was viewed at the time as a serious threat to the 
stability of the entire U.S. financial system. 
As shown earlier in table 8.4, the initial bank crisis arose in  1982 when 
what would later be a regular occurrence throughout the decade, a developing 
country with major debts to U.S.  and other banks-in  this case, Mexico- 
found itself unable to make interest payments on its debt.I8  At the time, the 
nine “money center” banks in the United States had loans outstanding to Latin 
American countries in the aggregate almost double their equity capital (Sachs 
and Huizinga 1987, 558). If  Mexico defaulted on its debt, then these banks 
faced the possibility of  defaults by  other developing country borrowers as 
well-a  circumstance that could have easily imperiled many, if not all, of the 
largest U.S. banking organizations. 
Federal regulators-principally  the Federal Reserve-had  to take this threat 
seriously. At the time, a toppling of one or more major banks in the midst of a 
recession (even in an expansion) could have threatened the entire banking sys- 
tem if uninsured depositors began to run from many other banks. Even the free 
market-oriented officials inside the administration  eventually grew concerned 
about such an outcome. In addition, the Federal Reserve no doubt felt some 
moral obligation to find some solution to the Mexican debt crisis and the threat 
it imposed to the U.S. banking system because, through much of the 1970s, 
it had encouraged the banks to recycle the “petrodollars” deposited by  oil- 
exporting nations in U.S. banks to oil-importing countries in the developing 
world, principally in Latin America. 
Initially, the Federal Reserve intervened directly in April 1982  by itself lend- 
ing dollars to Mexico in a series of currency swaps (dollars for pesos) (Greider 
1987,485-86). By August, however, Mexico’s economic situation had deterio- 
rated much further, and the threat of default became immediate. This time the 
Treasury joined the Fed in developing a larger financing plan to tide Mexico 
over until it could receive lending support from the International Monetary 
Fund (conditional on structural economic changes within Mexico to improve 
its ability to service its debt). Under the new plan, the U.S. government agreed 
to pay in advance for $2 billion of oil and food sold by Mexico, while the Fed 
and  other major  central banks agreed to  lend  an  additional $1.85 billion 
(Greider 1987, 517-18). 
Although the rescue plan devised by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
Department averted the immediate threat posed by the Mexican debt situation 
18. For a complete discussion of developing country debt problems in the 1980%  see the chapter 
by Paul Krugman in this volume. 536  Robert E. Litan 
to the U.S. banking system, Congress was not content to forget the matter. 
Directly responding to that crisis, in November  1983 Congress enacted the 
International Lending Supervision Act, which for the first time required the 
federal bank regulatory agencies to set and enforce minimum capital standards. 
Two  years earlier, the agencies had announced minimum capital guidelines 
but had done so purely as a matter of discretion, not in response to a specific 
statutory instruction. 
The new standards were not sufficient, however, to prevent the decade’s sec- 
ond major banking crisis: the failure of  Continental Illinois Bank in  1984. 
Ranked at the beginning of the 1980s as one of the best-managed banks in the 
country, Continental ran into difficulties early in the decade when it purchased 
what proved to be sour energy loans from a then little-known bank in Okla- 
homa,  Penn  Square,  which  failed  in  1982. As  Continental’s  loan  losses 
mounted, institutional depositors at the bank-principally  other banks from 
around the world-grew  increasingly concerned about the bank‘s  ability to 
survive and thus to honor in full the uninsured funds deposited with it. In May 
1984, these depositors began to run, threatening to bring down what was then 
the nation’s sixth-largest bank with over $40 billion in assets. 
Federal bank regulators-the  Comptroller, the FDIC, and the Fed-initially 
attempted to avert the crisis by cajoling other large U.S. banks to provide emer- 
gency credit to Continental. But, as with the early attempts to address the Mex- 
ican debt crisis, this early effort, too, proved insufficient. By midsummer, the 
deposit run had worsened and threatened to exhaust the credit extended by 
Continental’s would-be rescuers. Eventually, the FDIC decided to take over 
Continental and its holding company, extending full guarantees to all the bank’s 
depositors, both insured and uninsured. 
The regulators’ actions in the Continental crisis explicitly confirmed that, in 
fact, there were banks in the United States that were “too big to fail” (TBTF)- 
or, more precisely, too big for the regulators to permit uninsured depositors to 
lose  (Kaufman  1989). Four years  later, regulators would  demonstrate that 
banks and even thrift institutions not as large as Continental would also qualify 
for TBTF status. In each of these cases, uninsured depositors were explicitly 
protected in full: First Republic Banks of Texas (over $25 billion in assets); 
MCorp Banks of Texas (approximately $15 billion in assets); and American 
Savings and Loan of  California ($31 billion in assets). As discussed below, 
TBTF has since become one of  the most controversial and troubling of  all 
banking policies adopted in the 1980s. 
Securities Markets 
Finally, the 1980s were marked by three significant crises in U.S. securities 
markets, all occurring toward the end of the decade when the economy was in 
the midst of an economic expansion. For many, the surprising feature of each 
crisis was that none caused the expansion to end. 
The first and most noteworthy securities crisis, of course, was the stock mar- 537  Financial Regulation 
Table 8.10  Largest One-Day Percentage Stock Market Declines 
1. 19 October 1987 
2. 28 October 1929 
3. 29 October 1929 
4.6 November 1929 
5. 18 October 1937 
6. 20 July 1933 
7. 21 July 1933 
8.20  December 1985 
9. 26 October 1987 
10. 5 October 1932 
11. 12 August 1932 
12.31 May  1932 
13.26 July 1934 
14. 14 March 1907 
15. 14 May 1940 
16.26  July 1893 
17.24 September 1931 
18. 12 September 1932 
19.9  May  1901 
20. 15 June 1933 
21. 16 October 1933 
22.8 January  1988 
23.3  September 1946 
24.28 May  1962 
25.21 May  1940 
-20.39 
























Source: Schwert (1990). 
Note: Based on the Dow Jones Industrial and Railroad Indexes from 1928-62  and 1988-89  and 
the CRSP value-weighted index of New  York  Stock Exchange and  American  Stock Exchange 
stocks from 1962-87,  all including dividends. 
ket crash of  19 October 1987, which, as shown in table 8.10, was the largest 
one-day percentage drop in stock prices since official stock indexes have been 
computed. In addition, the 508-point drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) on 19 October was preceded by a decline of roughly 500 points dating 
from late August 1987. In the two-month period, investors in U.S. stocks lost 
over $1 trillion. 
The October 1987 crash created a crisis for several reasons. Most immedi- 
ately, the steep decline in stock prices threatened the liquidity, if not the sol- 
vency, of  any securities firms that were faced with potentially huge losses on 
securities they held in portfolio, either on their own account or as security for 
their margin customers, many of whom were unable to meet their margin calls. 
With securities firms imperiled, major banks began calling in their loans, fur- 
ther drying up liquidity and threatening the clearing of trades. At the larger, 
macroeconomic level, policymakers obviously were concerned that the crash 
would seriously damage investor and consumer confidence and thereby trigger 
a decline in spending sufficient to plunge the economy into recession. 538  Robert E. Litan 
As in the banking crises, the Federal Reserve was the lead agency most able 
and willing to take action. Fortunately, just weeks before the crash, on the 
order of its new chairman, Alan Greenspan, the Fed had completed a contin- 
gency plan to deal with precisely the events that unfolded in October. Accord- 
ingly, the Fed was ready to provide liquidity through open market operations 
(purchasing Treasury securities, thereby increasing the money supply and re- 
ducing short-term market interest rates). In addition, Fed officials reportedly 
urged leading banks to lend freely to securities firms experiencing liquidity 
problems; in turn, the Fed reportedly promised open access to its discount 
window if  the banks themselves then had liquidity difficulties (W‘U  Street 
Journal, 20 November 1987, 1, 23).19 
The Fed’s interventions worked. The stock market quickly bounced back 
and over the next two years marched steadily upward. By October 1989, the 
DJIA had returned to its pre-October 1987 level. Although at the time many 
economists predicted that the crash would significantly reduce GNP growth, 
that didn’t occur. Real GNP advanced at a 6.1 percent annual rate in the fourth 
quarter of 1987 and continued its upward climb thereafter, which permitted the 
Fed gradually to withdraw some of the liquidity that it had pumped into the 
markets immediately after the crash. 
Nevertheless, as summarized in table 8.11, the severe market jolt unleashed 
a torrent of government- and privately sponsored analyses of why it happened 
and what, if anything, could be done to prevent a recurrence in the future. As 
illustrated in the table, however, the studies reached no consensus on either the 
causes or the cures, if any. Much attention was paid in the media and in Con- 
gress to the role played by computer program trading strategies and stock index 
arbitrage, trading techniques that arose in the  1980s with the growth of the 
financial futures and options markets. Critics of  these strategies argued that, 
precisely because the “derivative” instruments were cheaper to trade than the 
underlying stocks (primarily because the cash deposits on futures were far 
lower than the margin requirements for stocks), they fueled the speculative 
behavior that ultimately led to the crash. Defenders of the derivative markets, 
principally the futures and options exchanges, argued that the derivatives and 
the underlying stocks were necessarily linked and that there was no evidence 
that, although futures and option trading had exploded in volume-indeed,  by 
the late 1980s, future trading volume (in dollar value) exceeded that on the 
stock market itself-it  had enhanced speculation. 
Whatever the merits of these respective positions, the various studies did not 
decide the outcome of this debate. In the end, the only significant actions taken 
in the wake of the crash were voluntary measures by the NYSE and the Chi- 
19. The  Wall Street Journal account of the crash noted above in the text also suggested that 
various brokerage firms may have manipulated the Major Market Index (a basket of approximately 
twenty stocks) on 20 October to induce a stock market rally on that day. However, as reported in 
table 8.1  1 below, one of the studies that examined this allegation found no evidence to support it. 539  Financial Regulation 
Table 8.11  Major Studies of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash 
Study 
The “Brady” Commission 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
New York Stock Exchange 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
National Association of Securities 
Dealers 
General Accounting Office 
Investment Company Institute 
Major Findings/Recommendations 
The crash was caused by external factors (high 
trade deficit; proposed tax legislation) 
Recommended that a single regulatory agency 
be responsible for market regulation; that 
margin requirements on stocks/futures be 
coordinated and that trading be halted during 
large price drops 
Institutional selling the largest direct factor in 
causing the crash; no evidence of 
manipulation of the Major Market Index on 
20 October 
brokerage firms 
to combat liquidity 
Index had been manipulated; concluded that 
money managers used portfolio insurance 
more than index arbitrage 
Recommended that stock index futures be 
traded on the floor 
Rejected tighter regulation of trading strategies 
and or margins 
Found that retail investors were net sellers of 
stock while institutional investors were net 
buyers 
Found that crisis was exacerbated by inability of 
the NYSE computer system to handle orders; 
recommended increased supervision of the 
computer sytem 
Mutual fund managers were able to meet nearly 
two-thirds of customer redemption demands 
during the crisis 
Criticized use of “front running” by  various 
Recommended margin requirements on futures 
Also found no evidence that Major Market 
cago Mercantile Exchange (the “Merc”) to introduce “circuit breakers” when 
stock or index prices dropped by certain amounts during a trading day.zo  Given 
the lack of consensus among the studies, coupled with these private initiatives, 
it is hardly surprising that Congress did not legislate in this area. 
Still, the stock market was again to crash at the very end of the decade on 
13 October 1989, or almost exactly two years after the October 1987 plunge. 
20. The Merc imposed a temporary trading halt during the morning of  24 July  1990 after the 
DJIA fell by  more than  100 points during the first hour of  trading; the halt was credited with 
helping break the price decline. Later that week, the SEC approved a parallel proposal by  the 
NYSE that required all stock index trades to be made on upticks following fifty-point declines in 
the DJIA. 540  Robert E. Litan 
The second time around, however, the DJIA dropped “only” 191 points, a 6.1 
percentage point decline. With the benefit of its successful experience follow- 
ing the October 1987 crash, the Federal Reserve had relatively little trouble 
reacting to the 1989 episode: it pumped additional reserves into the financial 
system, which lowered the interest rate on Federal funds (overnight borrowings 
by banks), and announced during the following week its readiness to provide 
needed liquidity. Again, the decisive action worked; the market quickly calmed 
and later resumed its upward climb into 1990. 
The final securities market crisis of  the 1980s-the  collapse of  the “junk 
bond” market-also  occurred at roughly the same time, with similarly benign 
macroeconomic consequences. The rise of the junk bond market, of  course, 
was one of the major success stories of the decade. Pioneered largely by one 
individual (Michael Milken) and one brokerage house (Drexel Burnham Lam- 
bert), this market was created by  matching institutional buyers hungry  for 
higher-yielding instruments with noninvestment grade corporate issuers. Al- 
though most junk bonds (by dollar volume) were issued in connection with 
corporate restructurings (leveraged buyouts, other mergers and acquisitions, 
divestitures, and other restructurings), many were also issued by new compa- 
nies without a long track record to earn an investment grade ranking from the 
private rating agencies (Crabbe, Pickering, and Prowse 1990,596). By the end 
of  1989, over $200 billion in junk bonds were outstanding, virtually all of 
which had been issued during the 1980s. 
The junk bond market weakened in 1988 when Michael Milken and his (by 
then former) brokerage firm were indicted for violating various securities laws. 
In the late summer of  1989, however, several events combined to force the 
market’s collapse-sharp  price declines of outstanding bonds and a virtual halt 
to new issues. The market began to unravel when a number of large, visible 
issuers of the bonds (Robert Campeau, Southland, and Integrated Resources, 
to name a few) defaulted. It was then severely shocked with the passage of 
FIRREA, which included provisions requiring thrift institutions to divest all 
their junk bond holdings by  1994. Although in the aggregate the thrift industry 
held only 7 percent of  all junk bonds outstanding and nearly 80 percent of 
thrift investments in these bonds were concentrated in just ten savings institu- 
tions (GAO 1988), junk bond investments became one of the visible symbols 
of excessive risk taking in the thrift industry that many members of Congress 
believed necessary to attack. Enacted at precisely the time when several junk 
bond issuers were already in trouble and confidence in the market tenuous, the 
divestiture provisions (whatever their merits) cast a long shadow over the entire 
market and propelled it down further. 
Ultimately, the junk bond market’s fall was so deep that its principal creator, 
Drexel Burnham, was forced to declare bankruptcy early in 1990. Significantly, 
in contrast with the rescues of uninsured depositors of major failed banks dur- 
ing the  1980s, neither the Federal Reserve nor the Securities and Exchange 
Commission lifted a finger to prevent Drexel’s demise, which caused barely a 
ripple in the financial markets when it happened. 541  Financial Regulation 
Summary 
Several themes run through the various financial crises of the 1980s. First, 
and perhaps most important, none of  them led to macroeconomic disaster, 
largely because of  successful crisis intervention by  the Federal Reserve, in 
conjunction with other banking regulators, when necessary. 
Second,  certain  of  the  interventions  had  significant longer-run  conse- 
quences. In particular, by protecting uninsured depositors at large banks out of 
fear of the destabilizing consequences of  large-scale bank runs, the banking 
authorities removed some of the market discipline against undesirable risk tak- 
ing by  large insured depositories. Much of the debate on financial reform in 
the 1990s will be aimed (indeed, it already has been) at finding ways to restore 
some of that discipline, whether by the market or by regulation. 
Third, congressional intervention occurred only where it was required or 
when there was a clear consensus about what needed to be done. The various 
pieces of thrift legislation were examples of the first type: in each case, regula- 
tors or administration officials could not resolve the crisis without legislative 
authorization (deposit interest and asset deregulation or funds required for res- 
olution of failed thrifts). In the case of the 1983 legislation requiring regulators 
to set and enforce bank capital standards, the Mexican debt crisis had already 
passed, but consensus was possible largely because regulators had already vol- 
untarily set out to do the same thing. In areas where there was no consensus 
among either the expert community or the relevant interest groups-for  ex- 
ample, securities market reforms or more the more basic structural financial 
issues discussed in the next section-it  was not surprising that Congress took 
no action. 
Finally, as indicated at the outset of the chapter, much of the financial policy- 
making in the  1980s was reactive in nature. In the thrift area in particular, 
the relevant policy-making institutions-the  Congress, the executive, and the 
independent regulator (the Bank Board)-took  few, if any, measures that could 
have mitigated, let alone prevented, the costly crises that eventually developed 
in the 1980s. The reasons for this inaction will be explored in later sections. 
8.2.2  Structural Trends 
The various financial crises of the 1980s obscured for policymakers and the 
public several significant structural developments that are likely to be at the 
top of the policy agenda in the 1990s. However, for reasons to be spelled out 
below, these developments attracted much less attention during the 1980s. 
Thrijts 
Again, it is appropriate to begin with thrift institutions because the funda- 
mental economic forces at work in this industry were perhaps most poorly 
understood or recognized by policymakers. 
Savings institutions developed in the early nineteenth century because no 
other intermediaries were then willing to originate and hold residential mort- 542  Robert E. Litan 
gage loans. The federal government has since promoted their growth by pro- 
viding thrifts with special tax benefits and by creating a series of federal agen- 
cies to purchase mortgages and thus to generate liquidity for the institutions 
that originate them. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, however, these same agencies-notably  the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal Na- 
tional Mortgage Agency (Fannie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac)-embarked  on a process that, as suggested earlier, 
has undermined the economic rationale for and the long-run profitability of 
the thrift industry. In the jargon of Wall Street, these agencies “securitized” 
mortgages by pooling them (or providing guarantees on pools arranged by pri- 
vate investment firms) and then issuing securities backed by these pools (for- 
mally mortgage trusts). As shown in .table 8.12, in just the thirteen years be- 
tween 1975 and 1988, the volume of mortgage securities grew by more than a 
factor of  forty, reaching nearly $770 billion in 1988, representing more than 
35  percent of all outstanding mortgages. 
Securitization has had revolutionary consequences for the thrift industry, 
which through the 1980s were barely appreciated in Congress. By converting 
formerly illiquid mortgage instruments into liquid securities, the securitization 
process  has substantially increased the demand for mortgage instruments. 
Now, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and even commercial 
Table 8.12  Securitized Mortgage Investments Outstanding ($billion) 
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Residential  GNMA  FNMA  FHLMC MBS  Conventional 


























































































Sources: Jaffee and Rosen (1990);  Federal Reserve Bulletin (October 1989); Board of Governors of  the 
Federal Reserve System, flow of funds accounts. 
Note: MBS = mortgage =  backed securities. PC =  participation certificates. 
Values after 1985 are securitized residential mortgages as a percentage of  home mortgages owed by 
nonfinancial sectors. 543  Financial Regulation 
banks are major holders of mortgage instruments. In turn, the larger demand 
has lowered mortgage yields, by  some estimates by  as much as a full per- 
centage point (Rosenthal and Ocampo 1988, 12), from what they would be 
otherwise. 
While this has been good news for consumers, it has been devastating for 
thrifts. With lower yields available on mortgages, thrifts have had to absorb a 
reduction in the “spread” that they have been accustomed to earning between 
their cost of funds and yields on mortgage investments. Indeed, the decline in 
the spread has been so substantial that, unless a thrift has a stable pool of low- 
cost deposits or happens to be in a high-growth market where mortgage yields 
command a premium, it can no longer earn a market rate of return on its capital 
by primarily holding long-term fixed-rate mortgages (Carron and Brumbaugh 
1991)-except  by  doing what thrifts traditionally did, gambling on interest 
rates by  funding long-term mortgages with short-term deposits (the maturity 
mismatching that caused the decade’s first thrift crisis). While profits may still 
be available from investing in adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), which thus 
far have not yet been securitized in substantial volumes, eventually the spreads 
in this line of business will also narrow considerably  as ARMs are standardized 
and securitized. 
The message for the thrift industry is hardly pleasant: it has no long-run 
future in  the American financial system. Eventually, currently health thrifts 
must become banks, or they will steadily join the list of  casualties that the 
government is already trying to bury. 
Although the implications of securitization  for the future of the thrift indus- 
try are widely recognized among policy analysts who specialize in this area, 
there is little or no evidence that they have thus far been understood in Con- 
gress or the administration, for that matter. FIRREA contains contradictory 
provisions relating to this subject. On the one hand, Congress demonstrated no 
appreciation for the implications of  securitization by  requiring thrifts to in- 
crease from 60 percent to 70 percent of assets their investments in mortgage 
and related consumer loans; this measure has only worsened the profitability 
problem that thrifts already confronted by further limiting their diversification 
opportunities. On the other hand, FIRREA also permitted thrifts eventually (by 
1994) to convert to bank charters and thus to escape the 70 percent “qualified 
thrift lender” requirement (although, unless they pay a large one-time fee, the 
converted entities must still pay  the higher insurance premiums required of 
all thrifts). 
As the costs of the thrift rescue effort continue to mount, it is increasingly 
likely that Congress and the administration  will reconsider whether to maintain 
separate bank and thrift charters and regulatory systems. Three factors have 
prevented a melding of the two industries thus far: the continuing (but weaken- 
ing) political influence of many savings and loans and the widespread percep- 
tion that the last thrift crisis of the decade was “caused” by provisions in the 
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factor is becoming less important as the remaining healthy thrifts realize that 
the only way that they will be able to survive as depositories is with a bank 
charter (but without the higher insurance premiums). The second factor should 
continue to have more lasting influence even if it is misplaced. Although it is 
clear that insolvent thrifts invested more of their assets in nontraditional  invest- 
ments (White 1991; and Barth and Bradley 1989),  they were encouraged to do 
so by  lax enforcement of capital standards, which invited precisely the kind 
of  risk taking with nontraditional investments that later led to higher losses 
(Brumbaugh, Canon, and Litan 1989). A key question for the 1990s is when 
policymakers-legislators  in particular-will  realize what really caused the 
thrift crises of the 1980s so that they can properly address the devastating im- 
plications that securitization is having for the thrift industry as it is presently 
structured. 
Finally, Congress has thus far been reluctant to meld the thrift and bank 
charters because of a seemingly innocuous, but critically important, distinction 
between the laws governing bank and thrift holding companies. In brief, the 
Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act limits the businesses with which any bank 
can be affiliated (by virtue of  its common parent holding company) to those 
that are “closely related to banking.” The Savings and Loan Holding Company 
Act contains a similar provision for thrift holding companies,  but only for those 
that own two or more thrifts. Accordingly, an organization owning only one 
thrift-such  as Sears or the Ford Motor Company-can  be engaged in any 
other activities it desires. 
If  the distinction between thrift and bank charters were eliminated, how 
would these unitary thrift holding companies be treated? If thrifts were treated 
like banks, then clearly the BHC Act would require the conglomerates  to divest 
themselves of any businesses “not closely related to banking.” Of course, many 
other  financial enterprises would  argue against divestiture and instead for 
changing the activity restrictions in the BHC Act. They would be opposed by 
those who believe that mixing “banking” and “commerce” could unwisely 
stretch the federal safety net to protect nonbanking enterprises. 
In the 1990s, it is likely that the questions surrounding the mixing of bank- 
ing and commerce will be addressed. If they are not, then it will be difficult, if 
not impossible, to meld the bank and thrift industries together (unless current 
unitary thrift holding companies are “grandfathered”). 
Banks 
Even less noticed is the fact the securitization is likely to have the same 
effects on the banking industry as it has had on thrifts. However, for banks, the 
securitization process started differently. 
Beginning in the 1970s, well-rated corporations that previously borrowed 
from banks found it cheaper and more convenient to issue their own commer- 
cial paper (generally backed, however, by a standby bank letter of credit). This 
process accelerated markedly during the 1980s: commercial paper issued by 545  Financial Regulation 
nonfinancial companies grew from $28 billion in 1980 to $85 billion in 1988. 
In addition, the growth of the junk bond market allowed many lesser-rated (or 
nonrated) companies to raise money more cheaply than by  borrowing from 
banks. The banks, of course, had only themselves to blame for losing their best 
borrowers to the markets. As a result of  mounting loan losses-initially  on 
loans to developing countries but by the end of the decade losses on real estate 
loans and for highly leveraged transactions-most  large banks suffered ero- 
sions in their credit ratings, which in turn made it more expensive for them to 
attract uninsured deposits. When bankers added even a slim spread to their 
higher cost of funds, they discovered that they could no longer profitably lend 
to their lowest-risk (and even medium-risk) corporate customers. 
The securitization of  bank loans will have similar effects on many other 
banks throughout the system. Although banks traditionally have not been as 
important sources of residential mortgage finance as thrifts, they nevertheless 
have suffered the same loss of maturity-matched spreads in mortgages due to 
securitization as have thrifts. More important for the future, banks are increas- 
ingly securitizing their bread-and-butter consumer loans (auto and credit card). 
It is widely expected that, eventually, they will do the same for many ordinary 
commercial loans. While individual banks that pioneer in the development and 
marketing of  these securitization techniques will no doubt profit from their 
efforts, the implications for the future of the banking industry as a whole are 
disturbing. With spreads reduced on their highest-quality assets, banks will 
increasingly hold  on their balance sheets only their higher-risk, nonliquid 
loans, posing future risks to the bank insurance fund, if  not to the banking 
system generally. 
Indeed, these risks have been mounting throughout the past three decades. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates that, since 1960, net loan losses have been rising as a 
percentage of  total bank loans outstanding,21  a trend that is reflected in the 
rising number and rate of  bank failures (see table 8.1 above). Similarly, as 
illustrated in table 8.13, the composition of  bank lending has been shifting 
away  from traditional commercial and industrial loans to real estate loans, 
which can be especially high risk, as events in Texas in the mid-1980s and at 
the end of the decade in New  England have demonstrated. Finally, the addi- 
tional risks show up in a dramatic increase during the 1980s in the numbers of 
“problem banks,” or those designated by bank examiners to have two of  the 
poorest bank ratings (of five possible rankings). Although the number of prob- 
lem banks declined at the end of  the decade from a 1987 peak of  1,575, the 
1,093 problem banks at the end of  1989 were nearly three times the previous 
2 1. A regression in logarithmic form of the net loan loss ratio against the unemployment rate 
and a time trend suggests that, over the period 1960-89,  the loss ratio has been rising at roughly 
6 percent (not percentage points) per year; the ratio also rises by an  estimated 79 percent for each 
percentage point of unemployment. Both coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 95 
percent confidence level; the equation (with a correction for serial correlation) explains 93 percent 
of the variance of the net loan loss ratio (in logarithmic form) over the period. 546  Robert E. Litan 
Fig. 8.1  Net loan charge-offs to average total loans (%) 
Sources: Statistical Abstruct of  the United States (various years); FDIC  published reports and 
data base. 
Table 8.13  Composition of Commercial Bank Loan Portfolios (% share of total 
IOanS) 
Type of Loan  1972  1975  1978  1981  1984  1987  1989 
Commercial and 
industrial  35.1  36.6  32.9  36.7  35.8  32.9  31.7 
Real estate  25.2  26.0  28.2  29.4  28.5  34.5  37.8 
Individual  22.1  20.3  22.0  18.9  19.2  19.3  18.9 
Security  4.0  2.6  2.6  2.2  2.6  2.0  1.9 
Nonbank financial  5.6  5.6  3.5  3.1  2.4  1.9  1.6 
Agricultural  3.7  3.9  3.8  3.4  3.0  1.7  1.5 
State and subdivisions  .O  .O  .o  .o  3.5  3.1  2.1 
Foreign banks and official 
institutions  1.4  2.2  3.5  2.6  1.4  .8  .7 
Lease financing, 
receivables  .4  .8  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.6 
Other  2.6  2.1  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.5  2.3 
Source: Economic Report of  the President (1990). 
postwar peak of 385 in 1976. Moreover, at the end of the decade many banks 
were still thinly capitalized by conventional, historical+ost  accounting stan- 
dards, which the thrift experience teaches can significantly overstate the true 
condition of financial intermediaries (Brumbaugh and Litan 1990). 
Given the implications of  securitization for banks as well as thrifts, what 
could policymakers do? Clearly, one step urged by virtually all academic spe- 547  Financial Regulation 
cialists in this area is to permit banks to diversify geographically  by expanding 
into all states, not only through holding companies, but also directly through 
additional branches. The largest banks that could best profit from this consoli- 
dation attempted to interest Congress in this reform early in the 1980s, but the 
move was strongly resisted by the thousands of smaller banks who feared they 
could not compete with the larger banks, the “money centers” in particular. In 
the absence of  a consensus among the interests most immediately affected, 
Congress was not inclined to act. In any event, the issue was rendered moot in 
1985 when the Supreme Court ratified the constitutionality of the reciprocal 
interstate banking arrangements legislated by various states in the early 1980s 
designed to permit large banks outside New York to grow into major regional 
institutions. By the end of the decade, all but a handful of states would have 
such arrangements;  several were already allowing or scheduled to permit bank- 
ing organizations from anywhere in the country (including New York) into 
their states. 
Another potential remedy to the rising risks of traditional banking is to per- 
mit banks or their holding companies to engage in a broader range of activities. 
However, given the poor name that thrifts gave “asset diversification” in the 
1980s, it was unlikely that Congress would take this approach. Moreover, the 
efforts by  banks to expand into other businesses-notably  securities, insur- 
ance, and real estate-were  vigorously opposed, quite predictably, by firms in 
those other lines of activity. This was the case even though nonbanking and 
even nonfinancial) firms had found their way into banking during the 1980s by 
exploiting several provisions in the laws governing bank and thrift affiliations. 
One particularly ingenious device used by a variety of firms was to acquire or 
open a bank that invested its federally insured deposits only in consumer, but 
not commercial,  loans. Such a “nonbank” bank (as it was called) could circum- 
vent the business affiliation (as well as the geographic) restrictions in the Bank 
Holding Company Act. Congress closed this loophole in 1987 (in the same 
legislation that authorized an additional $15 billion for the FSLIC). 
Nevertheless, during the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, a number of 
states have been sympathetic  with the banks’ arguments and have allowed their 
state-chartered banks into various activities (principally securities brokerage 
and underwriting and insurance agencies) that national banks cannot lawfully 
enjoy (Litan 1987a).  In these states, the interest-group  gridlock that stalemated 
congressional action either was not as strong as it was  on the federal level 
(because banking interests in the states had substantially greater political in- 
fluence than their rivals) or was superseded by state legislators eager to attract 
additional banking business to their states. 
In addition, even federal regulators were sympathetic with the banks. Late 
in the decade, the Federal Reserve exploited a loophole in the Glass-Steagall 
Act’s requiring separation of commercial and investment banking by authoriz- 
ing bank holding companies to establish separate securities underwriting affil- 
iates as long as they were not “principally engaged” in otherwise impermiss- 
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to earn up to 10 percent of their revenues from underwriting a wide range of 
non-Treasury securities. Similarly, the Comptroller  fo the Currency authorized 
national banks themselves to underwrite their own  asset-backed securities 
without going through investment banking companies. All  these decisions 
were upheld by the courts in the face of legal challenges by  the securities in- 
dustry. 
Yet  another policy option is to increase bank capital requirements, a step 
that Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan suggested in July 1990 
before the Senate Banking Committee (Greenspan 1990). The rationale for 
rising capital requirements is that, if  the banking system is experiencing in- 
creasing risk, then it ought to match the additional risk with additional capital. 
Coming on the heels of  the new capital standards negotiated as part of  the 
Basle Accord (discussed below), Greenspan’s suggestion not surprisingly has 
concerned the U.S. banking community, especially the larger banks now in- 
creasingly womed about their slipping international competitiveness. Indeed, 
some have argued that, if the banks have to meet higher capital standards, they 
will take additional risks to do so, precisely the opposite of what the Fed in- 
tends. Whether or not this is correct, the notion that banks meet even higher 
capital standards than those negotiated as part of the Basle Accord was not on 
the public policy agenda at any time during the 1980s. 
Finally, there is a question whether the deposit insurance system can be rede- 
signed to discourage some of the additional risk taking that banks clearly have 
evinced. Among the alternatives are to enhance depositor discipline by  low- 
ering or restricting current insurance coverage of $100,000  per deposit account 
or to increase discipline by  other interested parties-shareholders,  holders of 
uninsured (subordinated)  debt, and regulators. In the Garn-St. Germain Act of 
1982, Congress instructed each of  the major insurance funds (the FDIC, the 
FSLIC, and the National Credit Union Association) to report back with sug- 
gestions for reforming deposit insurance. Yet, as would be the case with the 
securities market studies later in the decade, these reports reached no consen- 
sus. In addition, in 1984 the problems with Continental Illinois and the weak- 
nesses at several other major banks made many in Congress hesitant to tamper 
with the deposit insurance system in any way that might destabilize deposits at 
large banks in particular. Not surprisingly, therefore, Congress took no action. 
When the third thrift crisis of the decade struck in 1988-89, Congress again 
directed that a study of deposit insurance be made (as part of HRREA), this 
time by the Treasury Department, which is scheduled to report its recommen- 
dations in early 1991. At this writing, it is not clear how Congress will respond, 
if  at all, to the Treasury’s study (nor is it known what the Treasury will rec- 
ommend). 
Securities Markets 
Although  the  nation’s  securities markets also experienced revolutionary 
changes during the 1980s, there was (and still is) much less agreement within 
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cations of these structural developments than about the market trends affecting 
the depository industries. Two particular developments deserve mention. 
First, and perhaps most important, the 1980s witnessed a growing institu- 
tionalization of the securities markets. For example, the share of block trading 
at the New York Stock Exchange rose from about 29 percent in 1980  to almost 
55 percent in 1988 (GAO 1990, 23). As noted earlier, institutionalization  was 
facilitated by  the deregulation of  fixed brokerage commissions in the 1970s, 
but it was also fueled by the growth of pension funds and by the increasing 
desire of individuals to diversify their stock holdings through mutual funds 
rather than on their own. 
As the markets have grown more institutionalized,  policymakers have begun 
to consider how to modify securities regulation and disclosure, most of which 
rests  on the Depression-era premise that individual investors must be pro- 
tected. Yet regulation, registration, and disclosure requirements can be expen- 
sive and raise capital costs for corporations issuing stocks and bonds here. In 
recognition of  these costs and the changes in market participation, the SEC 
introduced “shelf registration” in the  1980s for corporations that make re- 
peated use of the capital markets, streamlining the previous (often duplicative) 
registration requirements for individual securities issues. In addition, in 1990 
the agency adopted Rule 144a to allow corporate issuers to take advantage of 
a lower-cost method of raising capital if their securities were issued first only 
to institutional investors.z2  Such action portends possible two-tiered securities 
regulation in the future: one set of  rules for securities issued to individuals, 
another for securities bought and traded by institutions. 
Second, the institutionalization of  the securities markets was  a principal 
driving force behind the explosive growth of  the derivatives markets in the 
1980s-principally,  financial futures and options (on bonds, stocks, and stock 
and bond indexes).23  The derivative instruments allowed institutions to trade 
their large blocks of securities (whether for hedging, arbitrage, or speculation) 
more cheaply in derivative form than as stocks or bonds directly for two rea- 
sons. The derivatives markets offered lower margin requirements. In addition, 
as their dollar volume surpassed trading volume on the stock exchanges, the 
futures markets offered deeper and more liquid markets for institutional  traders 
than the markets for the underlying securities (where prices could be signifi- 
cantly moved by large institutional trades). 
The rise of the derivatives markets, however, led to one of  the most heated 
financial policy debates of the 1980s: whether financial futures increased the 
volatility of prices of the underlying securities and/or contributed to excessive 
speculative behavior. On the first question, there appears little room for argu- 
22. Specifically, the rule exempts U.S. and foreign corporations from registration requirements 
for bonds and stock sold to institutional investors with investment assets of $100 million or more 
and, in the case of banks and thrift institutions, with net worth of at least $25 million. In addition, 
the rule permits the resale of  these private securities to other qualified institutions at any time. 
23. Trading on options on individual stocks had been authorized in the 1970s  by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission. 550  Robert E. Litan 
ment. Whether measured by variations within a month or within a day, stock 
market returns show no trend increase in volatility since the mid-nineteenth 
century; there are major exceptions, of  course, surrounding various market 
crashes (29 October 1989, 19 October 1987, etc.), but erratic price movements 
on these occasions have been temporary (Schwert 1990, C-8-C-15). On the 
second question, however, there is no clear consensus among the experts, and 
thus, not surprisingly, Congress has not imposed higher margins on futures or 
consolidated futures regulation within one agency, as the SEC has suggested 
but the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has strongly opposed. 
Globalization and Competitiveness 
Finally, and perhaps most important for the 1990s, the U.S. financial system, 
like the underlying real economy, was shocked in the 1980s by global forces, 
a trend that has since spawned concerns about the “competitiveness” of U.S. 
financial institutions and markets. 
Table 8.3 above indicates that, by  one commonly cited benchmark, size 
rankings of banks, U.S.  depositories slipped badly during the 1980s. By the 
end of the decade, no U.S. bank ranked in the top ten in the world; only two 
made the top 50. The banks at the top of the list were all Japanese. 
In an age of securitization and financial innovation, however, asset size can 
be misleading since increasingly the largest profits are made in trading and 
fees. By profitability, U.S. banks even at the end of the decade looked much 
better: three of the five most profitable banks in the world (measured  by returns 
on  equity, adjusted for differences in capital ratios, inflation, and tax rates) 
were American and the other two European; Japanese banks ranked far down 
the list (Business Week, 2 July 1990, 80-85). 
Still, U.S. bankers could hardly take comfort from the fact that, during the 
1980s, they lost significant ground to foreign-based institutions. At home, 
where the competition is probably more important and certainly more evident, 
U.S. banks lost market share in commercial lending to foreign banks, dropping 
from 86 percent of  the market in  1980 to  72 percent by  1988 (“Foreign 
Bank Growth” 1990). And, weakened by their problem loans and shortage of 
capital, through much of the decade American banks withdrew from foreign 
markets (New York limes, 5 July 1990, Al,  D9). 
Ironically, the deteriorating competitive  position of U.S. banks led to one of 
the most important policy developments of the 1980s-one  with potentially 
far-reaching implications for future financial regulation. As they grew increas- 
ingly concerned about their loss of  market share, U.S. banks complained to 
their regulators that foreign banks, those from Japan in particular, were permit- 
ted by their authorities to operate with lower capital ratios and thus were able 
to leverage their limited capital into faster growth, both in their home markets 
and in the United States. Accordingly, they urged U.S. regulators to negotiate 
a common international bank capital requirement among the major industrial- 
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The banks’ request was received favorably by  the regulators, not just be- 
cause of their similar concern about a “level playing field,” but also because of 
their desire to raise capital standards for prudential reasons as well. By 1987, 
the Federal Reserve joined with its counterparts from ten other major countries 
in the Basle Capital Accord, which set common “risk-based” capital rules for 
banks in all these countries. The standards were risk based since different cate- 
gories of assets were weighted differentl~.~~  The regulators recognized that the 
new system failed to account for various other risks (related to portfolio com- 
position, susceptibility to interest rate movements, and liquidity), but they ar- 
gued that the new common standards were still better than the previous dissim- 
ilar rules in  different countries. At  this  writing, the  major  central banks 
are working to refine the risk standards to account for these additional risk fac- 
tors. 
Securities markets around the world also grew more globalized during the 
1980s, and simultaneously the U.S. markets became less dominant. For ex- 
ample, by  the end of the decade, the share of worldwide market capitalization 
represented by U.S. corporations had fallen from more than 50 percent in 1980 
to below 30 percent in 1988; Japanese stocks, in contrast, had vaulted into first 
place, with 45 percent (Hale 1990, 154).25  Although most stocks are still traded 
only in their country of origin, the shares of foreign stocks traded on the major 
exchanges around the world have been rising rapidly: by early 1990, trading in 
foreign stocks accounted for approximately 6 percent of the trading volume on 
the NYSE, 7 percent on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, over 20 percent on the 
London Stock Exchange, and above 30 percent on the other major European 
markets (OTA  1990, 29-30).  Ultimately, the organized exchanges may  give 
way  to private international trading networks (such as GLOBEX, operated 
jointly  by  the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Reuters) that  will  allow 
round-the-clockhound-the-world  trading. 
A critical question for the 1990s and beyond will be whether, and if so how, 
securities regulation will be coordinated internationally. In global markets, no 
country can exert its regulatory will without risking the transfer of its corpora- 
tions and/or its markets overseas. Indeed, critics of proposals to tax securities 
and financial instruments transactions-as  a way  of  reducing speculation- 
rest their opposition primarily on the risk that such a tax would drive much 
current trading off shore. Still, however, there is no consensus as to what de- 
gree, if any, U.S. securities authorities should be ready to yield their sovereign 
control over U.S. securities markets to a wider international  body of regulators, 
as their bank regulatory counterparts have already done. 
24. At one extreme, government securities carried 0 risk weight and thus no capital requirement; 
at  the  other extreme, commercial and most other nonmortgage loans carried a 100 percent risk 
weight and thus the full capital requirement. 
25. At this writing, however, U.S.  markets have reportedly regained the top ranking worldwide 
owing to the major drop in Japanese share prices during 1990. 552  Robert E. Litan 
8.3  Roads Not Taken 
With so many seemingly adverse developments affecting the U.S. financial 
markets and institutions during the 1980s, two natural questions are whether 
policymakers could have made better choices and, if so, why they didn’t. With 
respect to the structural developments in the financial arena just reviewed, the 
answers to these questions have already been suggested. Only in the case of 
interstate banking was there a clear consensus among independent experts on 
what should be done; neither Congress nor the administration acted because 
of  the deep split in views between large and small banks. On the need for 
additional bank product diversification and deposit insurance reform there was 
also a fair degree of consensus; however, among the experts, let alone the poli- 
cymakers, there was little agreement about the forms that these efforts should 
take. Finally, with respect to the developments in securities markets, there was 
no consensus either among the experts or among relevant interests on the 
proper policy reaction. 
Accordingly, the more interesting questions center on the alternative policy 
measures that could have been taken to avert or respond to the various crises 
of the decade. In the case of thrifts, starting the inquiry with the 1980s is too 
late, for several actions could have been taken in the 1970s that probably would 
have prevented most, if not all, of the damage that occurred the following de- 
cade. The Hunt Commission, for example, recommended in 197 1 that deposit 
interest controls be phased out and that banks and thrifts be allowed to offer 
ARMs. At that time, however, most depositories were not enthusiastic about 
the lifting of  interest controls, which would have raised their cost of  funds. 
Only by  the early 1980s, when market interest rates were so high above the 
Regulation Q ceilings that depositors were rapidly fleeing their banks and 
thrifts for money market funds, was the industry, and thus Congress, receptive 
to accelerated removal of the remaining interest rate controls. 
Lenders were more supportive of ARM authority in the 1970s,  but powerful 
forces in Congress were not. In particular, ranking members of  the banking 
committees feared that, in an environment of rising interest rates, ARMs would 
be detrimental to the interests of consumers. This attitude, too, would change 
by  1980, when the thrift industry was in serious trouble. 
Given, therefore, the inevitability of the 198  1-82  thrift crisis, was there any 
other course of action that policymakers could have adopted to avoid, or mini- 
mize, the subsequent asset quality crisis among thrifts? In theory, of  course, 
policymakers could have shut down all thrifts with negative net worths mea- 
sured at market value-or  most of the industry. But, as suggested earlier, this 
option would not have been politically realistic. 
The more feasible course would have been to impose growth limits on all 
thrifts with inadequate (or negative) capital and to have strengthened super- 
vision of weak thrifts, rather than weaken it as actually occurred. Clearly, in 
retrospect, this would have prevented much of the asset gambling that poorly 553  Financial Regulation 
capitalized thrifts were permitted to engage in with virtually unlimited quanti- 
ties of federally insured funds (White 1991, chaps. 5-7). 
The Bank Board, in fact, tried variations of this approach in the mid-1980s. 
It attempted to prohibit “brokered deposits” (deposit accounts just under the 
$100,000 ceiling placed by  brokerage firms in generally weak or insolvent 
thrifts offering high rates of interest), but this effort was rebuffed by the courts 
as outside the Board’s statutory authority. In 1984, the Board also limited direct 
investments by thrifts (equity positions in stocks, physical assets, or nonthrift 
businesses that various states allowed their state-chartered thrifts). 
However, in each case, the Board received little encouragement and, in some 
quarters, outright hostility. The deregulation-minded Treasury Department, as 
well as its former secretary and current White House chief of staff, opposed 
limits on the thrift industry, believing that, as the economic expansion contin- 
ued, insolvent thrifts would be lifted to healthz6  The same attitude prevailed in 
the banking committees of both congressional chambers, where many mem- 
bers were beneficiaries of political donations from thrifts, their owners, and 
their trade associations. Accordingly, by the time the Board was able substan- 
tially to increase the thrift supervisory force (by transferring thrift examiners 
to the independent Federal Home Loan Bank System, which was free from 
civil service salary caps and control by the Office of Management and Budget), 
it was too late. Many weak or insolvent thrifts had grown enormously and had 
already gambled (or defrauded) their way to big losses. 
The major “road not taken” during the two major banking crises, of course, 
would have been for the Federal Reserve not to have intervened and let market 
developments take their natural course. Of course, even with perfect hindsight, 
it is impossible to know how events otherwise would have played out. All that 
is known is that in each case-the  Mexican debt crisis of  1982, Continental 
Illinois in  1984, and the several large bank failures in  1988-policymakers 
feared that, if they did not intervene, not only would one or more banks fail, 
but uninsured depositors at other solvent banks would panic and run from 
them, too. 
Whether this concern was well grounded and, even if so, whether the conse- 
quences of a major deposit run would have been as devastating as policymakers 
apparently feared continue to be debated among legislators, administration of- 
ficials, and academic experts. Critics of  what has become known as TBTF 
argue that systemwide runs will not occur because uninsured depositors are 
capable of distinguishing solvent from insolvent depositories but that, even if 
a wider run started, it would not affect real economic activity since depositors 
would merely shift their funds from one bank to another, leaving the money 
supply in the banking system unchanged (Kaufman 1989). Furthermore, by 
26. Former Secretary Regan also tried during the mid-1980s to force the resignation of the Bank 
chairman, Ed Gray. Eventually, Gray’s term expired in  1987, and he was replaced with M. Danny 
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protecting all depositors at large banks, policymakers not only disadvantage 
smaller banks (whose depositors may not get the same treatment) but under- 
mine market discipline against risky bank behavior. 
Defenders of TBTF (very few openly “support” the concept) counter princi- 
pally by  pointing to the disruptive effects that a contagious deposit run can 
have, even if eventually all the funds are merely shifted around the banking 
system. In the interim, markets can become very unsettled, and interest rates 
can “spike” upward, as they have in previous financial crises (Carron 1982a). 
Even though temporary, the negative macroeconomic consequences may be 
too great for policymakers to risk, especially in the midst of  a recession, as 
was the case during the Mexican debt crisis in 1982. 
For these reasons, it is not surprising that, even today, the Federal Reserve 
continues to be skeptical about depositor discipline, especially for larger banks 
(Greenspan  1990,  13). One of .the interesting questions for  the  1990s is 
whether Congress will  nevertheless restrict the Fed’s  ability to  implement 
TBTF, as the American Bankers Association urged in 1990, or whether it will 
look elsewhere for additional discipline against excessive risk taking by banks. 
Finally, whatever one may believe about the wisdom of the Federal Reserve’s 
effective protection of uninsured depositors at large banks, it is universally 
agreed that the Fed took appropriate action in response to both stock market 
crashes of the late 1980s. Without the assurances of liquidity that the Fed pro- 
vided immediately  after both events, trading on the stock exchanges could have 
ground to halt, shattering not only the confidence of securities investors but of 
firms and consumers as well. 
8.4  Concluding Thoughts: Outlook for the Future 
In the  1980s, policy toward financial institutions and markets was driven 
largely by  crisis. Interest group deadlock on a variety of  structural issues- 
interstate banking, financial product restructuring, deposit insurance reform, 
and securities markets reforms-thwarted  at least Congress from taking any 
major initiatives. 
As the 1990s opened, however, the globalization of  financial markets and 
the growing intensity of foreign competition in the financial services industry 
has shifted the political balance. As part of its 1992 initiative, the European 
Economic  Community is  permitting the  development of  major integrated 
financial service firms. Japan  has been  gradually liberalizing its  financial 
markets and constraints on activities of  its banks and securities firms. With 
American financial institutions no longer dominant in the global market, pol- 
icymakers are paying increasing attention to how they can reform the nation’s 
financial structure to enhance the “competitiveness” of  U.S.-based financial 
institutions. In this environment, policymakers are likely to grow more re- 
ceptive to breaking the stalemate that has thus far persisted on many of  the 
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An open question is to what extent, and at what pace, policymakers in the 
United States will join with their counterparts abroad to harmonize regulation 
and supervision of financial institutions and markets. The Basle bank capital 
standards set an important precedent that may eventually be followed for other 
aspects of bank regulation (e.g., deposit insurance and bank affiliations with 
nonbanking enterprises), if  not during the 1990s, then conceivably after the 
year 2000. In addition, as already noted, as securities trading becomes more 
internationalized,  the prospects for international cooperation in securities reg- 
ulation also improve. 
Whatever policy decisions in the financial arena are made in the  1990s, 
Americans in this decade and beyond will be paying for the costly policy mis- 
takes of the previous two decades that led to the thrift debacle. The resolution 
of  the thrift crisis is likely to cast a shadow over financial policy-making in 
the 1990s. 
Finally, those who provide economic advice to policymakers can take away 
some valuable lessons from the 1980s. Perhaps the most important result from 
the decade is that the real economy proved to be far more resistant to the many 
financial upheavals than many would have predicted. This is largely because 
the Federal Reserve intervened to prevent each crisis from generating adverse 
macroeconomic effects. But, in the case of the stock market crashes in particu- 
lar, it appears that both consumers and firms were (and arguably still are) much 
less influenced by short-term stock price movements than may have been com- 
monly believed. 
Economists who advise policymakers on financial matters also, somewhat 
surprisingly, can take heart that their efforts ultimately will have  some use. 
Although policymakers largely ignored the advice of many banking specialists 
throughout the 1980s by failing to rationalize the regulation of  financial institu- 
tions and to reform the deposit insurance system, these issues are likely to be 
at the top of the agenda in the 1990s, and policymakers are already looking to 
the accumulated wisdom of the academic community for guidance. One hopes 
that the 1990s will have fewer crises to distract attention from the important 
structural issues in financial markets that should be addressed. 
References 
Barth, J. R., and P. F.  Bartholomew. 1990. The thrift-industry crisis: Revealed weak- 
nesses in the federal deposit insurance system. Paper presented to a Stanford Univer- 
sity conference, Washington, D.C., 18-19  May. 
Barth, J. R., P. E Bartholomew, and M. G.  Bradley. 1989. Reforming federal deposit 
insurance: What can be  learned from private insurance practices? Reserve Paper no. 
161. Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy and Economic Research, Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, June. 556  Robert E. Litan 
Barth, J. R., and M. G. Bradley. 1989. Thrift deregulation and federal deposit insurance. 
Journal of Financial Services Research (September), 23  1-59. 
Benston,  G. J.  1990a. The separation of commercial and  investment banking:  The 
Glass-Steagall Act revisited and reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
.  1990b. US. banking in an increasingly integrated and competitive world econ- 
omy. Paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute conference “International 
Competitiveness in Financial Services,” Washington, D.C. 
Brumbaugh, R. D., Jr. 1988. Thrifts under siege. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 
Brumbaugh, R. D., Jr., and A. S. Carron. 1987. Thrift  industry crisis: Causes and solu- 
Brumbaugh, R. D., Jr., A. S. Carron, and R. E. Litan. 1989. Cleaning up the depository 
Brumbaugh, R. D., Jr., and R. E. Litan.  1990. The banks are weaker than you  think. 
Carron, A. S. 1982a. Financial crises: Recent experience in U.S. and international mar- 
. 1982b. Plight of the thrifi institutions. Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 
Carron, A. S., and R. D. Brumbaugh, Jr. 1991. Viability of the thrift industry. Housing 
Crabbe, L. E., M. H. Pickering, and S. D. F’rowse. 1990. Recent developments in corpo- 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 1988. FDIC annual report. Washing- 
Foreign bank growth: Are U.S. fears justified? 1990. Washington Post, 24 June, H1. 
General Accounting Office (GAO). 1988. Financial markets: Issuers, purchasers and 
purposes of high yield, non-investment grade bonds. Washington, D.C., February. 
.  1990. Securities trading: SEC action needed to address national market system 
issues. March. 
Greenspan, A. 1990. Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs of the U.S. Senate. 12 July. 
Greider, W.  1987. Secrets of the temple: How the  federal reserve runs the country. New 
York Simon & Schuster. 
Hale, D.  1990. Global finance and the retreat to managed trade. Harvard Business Re- 
view (January-February),  150-62. 
Jaffee, D. M., and K. P.  Rosen. 1990. Mortgage securitization trends. Journal of Hous- 
ing Research 1:117-37. 
Kane, E. J.  1989. The S&L insurance mess: How did it happen? Washington, D.C.: 
Urban Institute. 
Kaufman, G. 1989. Are some banks too large to fail? Myth and reality. Working paper. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, June. 
Litan,  R. E.  1987a.  Financial  restructuring:  Which  way  for  Congress.  Challenge 
(November-December),  36-43. 
tions. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2:349-77. 
institutions mess. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1:243-83. 
Challenge (January-February),  4-12. 
kets. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2:395-422. 
Policy Debates 2:l-24. 
rate finance. Federal Reserve Bulletin (August), 593-603. 
ton, D.C. 
. 1987b. What should banks do? Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). 1990. Trading around the clock: Global secu- 
rities  markets  and  information  technology. Washington,  D.C.:  Congress  of  the 
United States. 
Pierce, J. L. 1991. The  future of banking. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Pratt, R. 1989. Discussion comments. In Thefiture of the thrz?  industry. Proceedings of 
the fourteenth annual conference of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco. 
Rosenthal, J. A., and J. M. Ocampo. 1988. Securitization of credit: Inside the new tech- 
nology ofjinance. New York: Wiley. 557  Financial Regulation 
Sachs, J., and H. Huizinga. 1987. U.S. commercial banks and the developing-country 
debt crisis. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2:555-601. 
Schwert, G. W.  1990. Stock market volatility. App. C in Market volatility and investor 
conjidence. Report to the Board of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, 24 
May. 
Sprague, I.  1985. Bailout:  An  insider’s account  of  bank failures  and  rescues.  New 
York: Basic. 
. 1990. Finger pointers rewriting history of  S&L crisis. American Banker; 22 
White, L. J.  1991. The S&L debacle: Public policy lessons for banks and thrifts. Ox- 
August, 5, 19,26-27. 
ford: Oxford University Press. 
2.  William A4. Isaac 
It is a distinct honor and privilege for me to be invited to appear before such a 
distinguished group of  scholars. My friend Marty Feldstein has asked that I 
address the collapse of the savings and loan (S&L) industry. 
I guess I’m in a rather unique position to comment on the collapse of  the 
S&L industry in that I served as chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) from 198  1 through 1985 when the seeds of the S&L disas- 
ter were sown. Some of  you  might not be aware that the FDIC insures the 
deposits in the savings bank industry and that the savings banks were suffering 
the same kinds of problems as the S&Ls in the early 1980s. It’s an interesting 
case study to compare the widely divergent ways in which the FDIC and the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) responded to these 
problems. 
Before I get into that subject, I need to go back in time to set the stage. 
Thrifts were created in the nineteenth century in response to a market need. 
Banks were not satisfying the desire of consumers for a safe haven for their 
savings dollars and for a vehicle to finance their most basic and expensive 
need: housing. Thrifts were formed, initially as philanthropic organizations,  to 
fill the void. 
Across the span of a century, market conditions changed dramatically. Not 
only banks, but also many other financial intermediaries,  recognized the oppor- 
tunities for profit in serving consumers and developed the products to do so. 
In the meantime, in response to the banking collapse of the 1930s, the gov- 
ernment had intervened with a series of measures designed to limit competi- 
tion. Interest rate controls were put in place to restrict price competition. A 
rate differential was established to encourage the flow of  funds to thrifts. A 
deposit insurance system was  created to maintain stability and to preserve 
a diverse (and uneconomic) banking structure. Laws were passed mandating 558  William M. Isaac 
that thrifts function as nondiversified lenders. Branching restrictions severely 
curtailed geographic expansion and diversification. And other fences, such as 
the Glass-Steagall Act, were erected to keep the various types of financial in- 
termediaries on their own distinct playing fields. 
The first signs of tension in this rather comfortable scheme began to appear 
in the 1960s. The Johnson administration’s “guns and butter” fiscal policy in 
the mid- 1960s set off inflationary pressures that led to higher and more volatile 
interest rates, which impaired the viability of long-term lenders such as thrifts. 
Largely in response to these pressures, in  1971 the Hunt Commission rec- 
ommended that deposit interest rate controls be phased out, that thrifts and 
other lenders be allowed to offer variable-rate mortgages, and that mutual 
thrifts be permitted to convert to stock form of ownership. The recommenda- 
tions were ignored by the administration and Congress. 
My old agency-the  FDIC-committed  what I believe was a major public 
policy mistake in 1972 when it greatly expanded the scope of coverage of the 
deposit insurance system: rather than allowing the Bank of the Commonwealth 
in Detroit to fail, the FDIC infused capital into it. All creditors were also bailed 
out by the FDIC at U.S. National in San Diego in 1973 and Franklin National 
in New York in 1974. 
President Roosevelt had been opposed to a federal deposit insurance system 
when it was proposed in the 1930s. He believed that it would be unduly expen- 
sive and doomed to fail because it would force the well-managed banks to 
subsidize the high flyers. A compromise was reached calling for very limited 
depositor protection plan-initially  only $2,500 per account. Amounts above 
the insurance limits were to be exposed to the risk of loss. The FDIC’s actions 
in 1972, 1973, and 1974 represented a vast expansion of the scope of  the de- 
posit insurance  program and, I’m convinced,  began the process of undermining 
discipline in our financial system. 
The Federal Reserve Board committed a significant mistake in 1977 when 
it ruled that bank holding companies could not acquire healthy thrifts. Some- 
how the Fed managed to find that the operation of a thrift was not sufficiently 
related to banking to allow bank holding companies to enter the business. The 
real reasons were political: the Fed did not want to offend the thrift industry or 
the smaller banks, which viewed bank holding company acquisitions of thrifts 
with alarm because they would permit the larger banks to bypass the restraints 
on geographic expansion. This decision by  the Fed was critically important 
because it prevented the thrifts from becoming part of diversified financial in- 
stitutions. 
Inflation raged during the Carter administration,  with the prime rate soaring 
above 21 percent. Thrifts-both  S&Ls and savings banks-suffered  massive 
disintermediation and began to hemorrhage red ink owing to their long-term, 
fixed-rate loan portfolios. 
Congress belatedly authorized deregulation of interest rates in 1980. But, by 
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folios of long-term, fixed-rate loans, and banks and thrifts alike had invested 
heavily in staffs and bricks and mortar to enable them to engage in the only 
form of  competition previously allowed: nonprice competition. Banks and 
thrifts should have been provided a lengthy phase-in period to adjust to interest 
rate deregulation, as would have been the case if  Congress had acted in the 
early 1970s when the Hunt Commission made its recommendations. Instead, 
they were thrust into a deregulated environment virtually overnight. 
When the Reagan administration entered office in 1981, it was faced with 
an overwhelming number of failing thrifts. It’s important to note that the prob- 
lem at this point was an interest rate spread problem, not asset quality, and 
it affected both S&Ls insured by  the FSLIC and savings banks insured by 
the FDIC. 
At the FDIC, we formed a savings bank project team in early 1981 to study 
the problems and come up with a program for dealing with them. We  con- 
cluded that our regulatory response needed to be relatively stringent in order 
to prevent the problems of the weaker savings banks from contaminating the 
stronger ones. We decided that we would merge savings banks that were insol- 
vent on a book or liquidity basis into relatively strong institutions with FDIC 
financial assistance. Because the insolvencies were being caused by what we 
hoped were extraordinarily high interest rates that would eventually recede, 
we decided that, in most cases, our financial assistance should take the form 
of income maintenance agreements. These agreements called for the FDIC to 
guarantee the acquiror a positive interest rate spread on the acquired asset port- 
folio. The deals were structured so that the acquiror’s assumed cost of funds 
was the average cost of funds for the region rather than the actual cost. This 
gave the acquiror an incentive to hold down the interest rates paid on deposits. 
The agreements assumed that the composition of an acquired asset portfolio 
did not change from the date of  acquisition except for an assumed runoff of 
the portfolio due to principal repayments. This gave the acquiror the incentive 
to restructure the asset portfolio as interest rate conditions warranted. 
It was our belief that these types of agreements would enable the FDIC to 
resolve the savings bank problems at the lowest possible cost. When interest 
rates receded, payments under the agreements would cease. Acquirors would 
receive whatever amount of money was needed to carry them through the high 
interest rate period and no more. 
We ran projections on the cost of resolving the savings bank problems under 
a variety of  interest rate scenarios, including a worst-case scenario that as- 
sumed that rates would continue to rise almost indefinitely. We could envision 
the possibility that the FDIC fund would be depleted. We made a conscious 
decision that we would not allow the finite nature of our financial resources to 
dictate our regulatory response. We would do what we felt we needed to do, 
and, if we ran out of money, we would go to the Congress and ask for more. 
For savings banks that were technically solvent but failed to meet our nor- 
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operation so long as they did not do anything to increase the FDIC’s exposure 
to risk. In short, this meant that we would not allow them to grow by  more 
than a nominal amount, engage in new activities, or pay above-market rates for 
deposits. So long as a marginally capitalized savings bank behaved itself and 
did not increase its risk profile, it made financial sense for the FDIC to deal 
with it later, after interest rates receded, rather than sooner. If  it began to in- 
crease its risk profile, the FDIC would deal with it immediately, as the Bowery 
Savings Bank in New York and a couple of others learned. 
Over at our sister agency, the FSLIC, a different approach was taken. Weak 
S&Ls were merged into other weak S&Ls. The asset portfolios were marked 
to market in the merger, and the resulting goodwill was allowed to be counted 
as capital to support future growth. Capital standards were lowered, and regu- 
latory accounting techniques, such as loss deferral and appraised equity capi- 
tal, were authorized to enable insolvent S&Ls to continue in operation and 
even grow. 
On the basis of conversations that I had at the time with the top officials of 
the FSLIC and its parent, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, it was felt that 
the FSLIC did not have sufficient funds to deal with the S&L problems and 
that the proper response was therefore to defer dealing with the problems as 
long as possible. It was felt that one solution was to allow S&Ls to grow their 
way  out of  the interest rate mismatch-to  bury their old portfolios of  low- 
yielding assets with newly booked assets carrying much higher yields. 
I must say that, at the time, the FSLIC’s policies received a far more favor- 
able response within the industry and in political circles than the FDIC’s poli- 
cies did. Loss-deferral accounting is a case in point. That accounting technique 
allowed a thrift to sell its underwater assets at a loss, book the loss as goodwill 
to be amortized over a period of  years, and reinvest the proceeds in assets 
earning higher yields. The thrift industry, many state banking departments, and 
many members of  Congress favored loss-deferral accounting. The FDIC felt 
that booking the goodwill as capital would only lead to greater problems in the 
future, so it refused to permit the technique even after the state of New York 
adopted rules allowing savings banks in  New  York  to use loss-deferral ac- 
counting. 
In 1982, Congress, with the support of the Reagan administration, passed 
the Garn-St.  Germain Act. That law  sanctioned the policies being pursued 
by  the Bank Board and the FSLIC. It broadened the lending and investment 
authorities of  S&Ls and reduced capital standards for thrifts by mandating a 
net worth certificate program. From this point forward, S&Ls began a tremen- 
dous growth spurt, with much of the growth in higher-risk activities. 
In 1983, the FDIC issued a study calling for significant reforms in the de- 
posit insurance system to instill greater depositor discipline in an environment 
of  deregulated interest rates. The study, which was ignored by  the Congress 
and the administration, concluded that the de facto system of  full depositor 
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terest rate deregulation. If  changes were not made to put depositors at risk, a 
disproportionate amount of the funds would flow to the marginal institutions 
willing to pay the highest rates. 
Ed Gray took office as chairman of the Bank Board in 1983. After serving 
about a year, Gray became concerned about the rapid growth and risky invest- 
ments in the S&L industry. Much of  the growth was being funded by  fully 
insured brokered funds, so Gray joined me in causing the FDIC and the FSLIC 
to adopt regulations curtailing deposit insurance coverage on brokered funds. 
The money brokers challenged the regulations, and the federal court ruled that 
the agencies lacked statutory authority. The battle moved to Capitol Hill, but 
the agencies’ position was opposed by the administration and key members of 
Congress. This defeat suffered by  the FDIC and the FSLIC would ultimately 
prove to be extraordinarily expensive to the American taxpayers. 
The Bank Board’s examination force was grossly understaffed to keep pace 
with the rapid growth and mounting problems in the S&L industry. Ed Gray 
sought permission from the administration to increase examiners’ salaries and 
increase the work force. While he ultimately prevailed, it was only after much 
delay and considerable infighting. 
In  1985, Gray proposed to limit the investment authority of  S&Ls. He met 
with stiff opposition from the S&L industry, the administration, and key mem- 
bers of Congress, so he had to trim his proposal. 
The administration finally began to pay some attention to the S&L problems 
in 1986 and proposed to recapitalize the FSLIC to the tune of $15 billion. The 
measure was strongly opposed by the U.S. League of Savings Institutions and 
by  key  members of  Congress, such as the then speaker of  the House, Jim 
Wright, and was cut back to $5 billion. 
Ed Gray left office in 1987, discredited and under attack by the administra- 
tion, the industry, and the Hill. Danny Wall became chairman of  the Bank 
Board, determined to improve the S&L industry’s tarnished image. He consis- 
tently understated the industry’s problems and steadfastly maintained that the 
FSLIC had enough money to handle things. This allowed the politicians to 
continue ignoring the situation until after the 1988 elections. By this time, the 
losses had grown to unfathomable proportions. 
In extending me the invitation to speak today, Marty asked that I focus on 
the development of the problem, not on future solutions. So I will endeavor to 
be true to his charge. But I believe that it is essential that we learn some lessons 
from what is clearly the sorriest episode in American financial history. In my 
judgment, the foremost lesson is that attempts by  the government to interfere 
with the operation of  the markets are doomed to fail, no matter how well in- 
tended. Government interference with the markets-the  restraints on  geo- 
graphic and product diversification, the controls on interest rates paid on de- 
posits and charged on loans, the refusal to allow thrifts and banks to combine, 
and the overly broad protection of depositors-was  without question the direct 
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The second lesson is that there is a critical role for the government to play 
in supervising the financial system. The government needs to play the role of 
the traffic cop, whose duty is to establish and enforce the rules of the road. 
Certain basic rules of safety-such  as capital standards and risk diversification 
requirements-must  be established. 
If the government is to enforce these rules properly, we must ensure that the 
regulatory agencies are as free as possible from political interference and that 
there are proper checks and balances in the system. I am convinced that the 
savings bank problems were better contained than the S&L problems because 
the insurer-the  FDIC-was  able to function as an independent watchdog and 
was relatively free of  political pressures. The FDIC was independent of the 
primary regulator of savings banks and was relatively independent  of the politi- 
cal process. It did not need, for example, approval of  its budget or staffing 
levels from Congress or the administration.  The FSLIC, in contrast, was orga- 
nized as a subsidiary of the Bank Board, which was the primary regulator of 
S&Ls. Moreover, it needed approval of its budget and staffing levels from both 
the administration and the Congress. This almost forced the agency into an 
incestuous relationship with the industry it was supposed to be regulating in 
order to gamer the political support it needed. 
3.  William Taylor 
I am in general agreement with Litan and Isaac on the factors they have cited 
this morning as being responsible for the crisis in the savings and loan industry 
and the strains in banking and other sectors of the financial system. If we have 
differences, they are to be found in the degree of importance to be assigned to 
particular factors. Accordingly, I will use my time to indicate which factors I 
think deserve greatest emphasis. 
The impact of the increasingly competitive market conditions that evolved 
during the 1980s cannot be overemphasized. There is an old saying that, left to 
compete to the death, many will die. So it has been with financial institutions. 
Increased competition led to a narrowing of revenuekost margins and a loss 
of customers with consequent effects on profitability. In response, institutions 
increasingly turned to risky loans and to risky ventures in an effort to maintain 
profitability and, indeed, in some cases viability. 
The intensified competition can be traced to many  factors. Financial and 
technological innovation added greatly to competitive pressures coming from 
outside the industry. The development of money market mutual funds by non- 
bank financial firms constituted a particularly important challenge to the fund- 
ing activities of banks, large and small. 
Banks also became subject to major new competitive pressures in their lend- 563  Financial Regulation 
ing activities. Banks traditionally had a special access to comprehensive, and 
somewhat exclusive, credit information and special expertise in analyzing that 
information. Enhanced technology made the information more readily access- 
ible to everyone in the marketplace, thereby limiting the uniqueness of banks 
in this regard. Technological innovation also enhanced opportunities  to achieve 
economies within the industry through merger and consolidation, thus adding 
to competitive pressures on high-cost, inefficient firms. 
These developments, moreover, produced strong pressures to dismantle an 
array of legal and regulatory restrictions so that depositories would be able to 
compete more effectively and take advantage of the new profit opportunities. 
The resulting removal of these restrictions, however, proved to be a double- 
edged sword because the dismantling of arrangements that had long protected 
depositories from competition was also involved. Proponents of  dismantling 
the restrictions and the protections offer that a more efficient system will de- 
velop to better serve the public. This may indeed be true, but, in the meantime, 
the process can be painful, as has been dramatically demonstrated. 
Of the host of public policy decisions that affected competitive conditions 
in the banking business in the decade of the 1980s, some were more heralded 
than others and some more significant than others. Early in the decade much 
was made of the deregulation  of interest rates as banks clamored for the oppor- 
tunity to compete with money market mutual funds. As the rate deregulation 
took hold, there was an increasing call for increases in the services that banks 
could offer. It was said that banks and thrifts must be deregulated on both sides 
of the balance sheet if they were to be effective competitors in the new world. 
And, indeed, to some degree the powers of banks were expanded and those of 
thrifts maybe a bit more. 
As the focus of  attention was riveted on expanded powers at the national 
level, a public policy impact at least as dynamic in my  view was occurring 
at the state level, for states were not only liberalizing the powers of banking 
organizations but also easing intrastate and interstate geographic restrictions. 
The country entered the 1980s with only one state that would allow holding 
companies located outside the state to buy a bank within its borders, the state 
of Maine. It ended the decade with forty-seven states having laws that allow 
the interstate expansion of bank holding companies, albeit some more restric- 
tive than others. And the degree of intrastate liberalization of branching laws 
was almost as extensive. 
Another significant area of public policy in the 1980s involved the question 
of who could merge with whom. At the beginning of the decade, there was a 
whole apparatus in place in the government to see that competition within a 
geographic area was carefully monitored and maintained. In considering a pro- 
posed merger or acquisition, great effort was made to determine whether one 
market circle intersected with another market circle to the detriment of current 
competition, or future competition, or future potential competition. Concern 
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of the combination of a few court cases and a new set of antitrust guidelines 
as well as the advent of interstate banking. The result has been the removal of 
barriers to entry of  companies from “outside” a geographic region and the 
general encouragement of the merger, acquisition, and consolidation process. 
Occasionally, a proposed merger will raise competitive issues, such as the re- 
cent case in Hawaii, but for the most part opposition to concentrating and con- 
solidating the banking industry is now considerably diminished from what it 
was at the start of the 1980s. 
For example, prior to 1980, the Federal Reserve approved no more than a 
few mergers or acquisitions  by bank holding companies where the target com- 
pany or bank had more than $1 billion dollars in assets. In the 1980s, on the 
other hand, almost 100 such mergers or acquisitions were approved. As a re- 
sult, the number of banking organizations in the country, as measured by the 
sum of bank holding companies plus the number of  independent banks, was 
reduced by almost 25 percent. So, while many view the deregulation  of interest 
rates and the liberalization of powers as the big developments of the 1980s, I 
would offer that at least as much impact resulted from the policy decisions 
pertaining to structure and competition. 
In  addition to policy decisions that affected the competitive positions of 
depositories, there were also others that had significant effects on the course 
of developments over the decade. Two in particular require mention because 
of the adverse impact that they have had. First, it seems logical that a bank or 
thrift institution that cannot compete effectively in the marketplace and be- 
comes insolvent should be closed promptly and sold or liquidated as soon 
thereafter as practical. Yet  to do so in  an insured system requires having 
enough in the insurance fund to pay depositors. In the 1980s, there was not 
enough money in the thrift insurance fund and therefore various artificial mea- 
sures were taken to keep troubled institutions open. This approach has proved 
to be very costly. 
The second policy decision deserving special mention was what I call adop- 
tion of  the desupervision principle. We, the supervisors, some more aggres- 
sively than others, reacting to our own budgetary problems of the mid-l970s, 
decided to alter the manner in which banks were examined and supervised. 
The “top-down’’ approach became popular. In place of labor-intensive  on-site 
audit and evaluation procedures, the bank examination process became more 
off-site and consultative in nature. Off-site surveillance systems were devel- 
oped from financial reports submitted by the banks. Policies and procedures at 
banks were reviewed with less emphasis on specific assets. The time between 
on-site exams was extended materially, and in general there was less compre- 
hensive and independently developed information on each bank. 
Without denying the benefits of surveillance systems or the need for policy 
review, let me state my view that the extent of the shift to this less hands-on 
and less often approach to supervision must be questioned. It seems essential 
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as their purpose the determination of whether assets are of good enough quality 
to generate the cash flow required to meet obligations due to the bank‘s deposi- 
tors and creditors and whether the bank’s books need to be adjusted to reflect 
reasonable values. I think that the experience  of the 1980s demonstrates  clearly 
the wisdom of the annual, full-scope examinations, and I believe that all agen- 
cies responsible for supervision will adhere to this approach in the coming 
decade. 
In  summary, the problems of  depositories and the financial system more 
generally that developed in the 1980s can be attributed primarily to the intensi- 
fication of competitive conditions, resulting from financial and technological 
innovation and from changes in public policies-the  deregulation of  deposit 
interest rates, new and sometimes riskier powers, liberalized antitrust policies, 
and the loosening of restrictions on geographic expansion. All these promise 
net benefits to society in the long run in the form of a more efficient delivery 
of  services to the public at lower cost, but they create or intensify difficulties 
for firms competing in these markets during the transition period. Compound- 
ing the effects of  intensified competition were shortfalls in the execution of 
two public policies in particular-the  manner in which distressed institutions 
were resolved and the reduced emphasis given to “hands-on” on-site examina- 
tions in the supervision process. 
Summary of Discussion 
Robert Litan praised Isaac’s management of the financial problems in the sav- 
ings bank industry and agreed with Isaac’s assessment that the FDIC had been 
more successful dealing with savings banks than the FSLIC had been with 
thrift institutions. He noted, however, that the FSLIC’s thrift problem had been 
of much greater magnitude. In the early 1980s, roughly 70-85  percent of the 
thrifts were losing money; on a market-value basis, the thrift industry was over 
$100 billion in the red. The problem in the savings bank industry was not 
nearly as large, so Litan asked Isaac whether he would have made similar pol- 
icy decisions had he been handling the thrift crisis instead. Would he have 
requested more money with which to resolve the problem directly, or would 
he first have pursued a policy of shrinkage or at least containment of growth? 
As a second point, Litan responded to Isaac’s suggestion that banks should 
have been given permission back in  1977 to buy healthy thrifts. He agreed 
that many bank organizations would have bought healthy thrifts as a way  of 
circumventing  the interstate restrictions. Had this happened, however, it would 
not have eliminated the thrift crisis. Although separately  capitalized, the failing 
thrifts would have been affiliates of  banks through their holding companies, 
and these holding companies would have been facing a large insolvency prob- 
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ficulty dealing with the LDC debt problem when it arose. On the other hand, 
had there been many banks in such difficulty, Volcker would have had at least 
partial jurisdiction over the resolution of the thrift crisis. Would that have im- 
proved the outcome? 
Litan also argued that one should not become obsessed by the crises in the 
financial industry and forget that both the savings banks and the thrifts suffered 
from underlying structural  problems. In the long run, securitization  would have 
eliminated the need for a separate thrift industry even without the crisis in the 
1980s: thrifts simply would have become less and less profitable as separate 
institutions. In a slower way, the same thing is happening to the banking indus- 
try. Over the last thirty years, loan losses have been steadily rising in the bank- 
ing industry as banks have taken greater and greater risks in response to some 
systemic pressure. The increased risk creates a need, as Taylor suggested, for 
more capital in the banking system. 
William Isaac responded that he would not have handled the savings and 
loan crisis differently than he had handled the savings bank problem. The poli- 
cies that he pursued were those suggested by  professional bank supervisors; 
his role was protecting the professional staff from political pressure, and he 
had been willing to take the heat from Congress if there were objections to 
the policies. 
The excuse that the FSLIC had bigger problems relative to its capital than 
did the FDIC is not a new  one. The problem that the FDIC faced with the 
savings bank industry, however, was actually quite large-there  was no cer- 
tainty that they had enough money to deal with the problem. As it turned out, 
interest rates came down, and the problem was solved at a cost of several bil- 
lion dollars. But, under other projected scenarios, the fund could easily have 
gone broke. Even so, the agency made the decision that it would spend what- 
ever it took to do the job right and would go to Congress and ask for more 
money if it were needed. The agency believed that the alternative was to create 
an even bigger problem in the future, which would have required even more 
money to resolve. This same logic would have pertained to the savings and 
loan industry, and Isaac would have followed the same path. He would not have 
encouraged expansion, as the FSLIC chose to do, but would have curtailed 
growth and asked Congress for more money if necessary. 
Churls  Walker submitted two corrections to earlier comments. First, the 
Treasury Department during the first Nixon administration wanted to institute 
financial reform before problems grew into crises. It was drawn off track, how- 
ever, because the first task to which it was directed was the one-bank holding 
company legislation. Walker noted that he had tried to prevent the Federal 
Reserve from becoming the regulator of  bank holding companies, but had 
been unsuccessful. 
Second, with respect to the Hunt Commission, everyone had agreed that 
reforms were needed with respect to deposit interest rates and other issues. 
Walker had argued, however, that, in order to get through Congress, the pro- 567  Financial Regulation 
posal needed to come from a blue-ribbon commission of leaders in the affected 
industries. A commission was formed, and it developed an excellent report, 
but in  1971 and 1972 the Treasury sponsored a great deal of legislation on 
other issues. This meant that action on the Hunt Commission report was post- 
poned until just before Walker left the Treasury, and by that time no one was 
very  interested anymore. Walker felt that both these points show that there 
were efforts to solve some financial regulation problems in other than a crisis 
situation but that the turn of events prevented their success. 
Elizabeth Bailey highlighted Isaac’s comment that Roosevelt had worried 
about levying deposit insurance premiums on the basis of average risk in the 
industry so that banks that had not made risky loans would end up subsidizing 
banks that had made risky loans. She observed that the policies in the late 
1980s have set up exactly that kind of system, resulting in enormous premiums 
on deposit insurance in exactly the way  that Roosevelt had feared. Isaac re- 
sponded that he too is very concerned about the current deposit insurance sys- 
tem, which requires very basic reform. 
Rudolph Penner returned to an ongoing conference theme regarding the in- 
fluence of policy analysts on different issues. He believed that the analysts had 
been particularly ineffective with regard to the deposit insurance fiasco. One 
reason was the work of lobbyists and the flow of campaign funds to Congress. 
Another reason was colossal ignorance on the part of  legislators-analysts 
simply had no credibility relative to a local thrift owner who was decrying his 
troubles. Thrifts really had a wonderful image in the 1980s. 
There was one aspect of analysis, however, on which a lack of credibility 
was deserved, and that was the estimates of the cost of the problem. In January 
1986, the Congressional  Budget Office (CBO) was suggesting  that the problem 
could have costs as high as $25 billion. By the summer of  1988, Litan’s paper 
quotes Danny Wall [chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board] as esti- 
mating $40 billion, and the CBO was projecting nearly $100 billion. What 
went wrong with the estimates technically that made them so misleading? 
Litan responded that he spends a lot of time doing cost estimates, and one 
of the key problems is that the estimates must rely on the financial statements 
of the institutions themselves. Roughly speaking, the estimates are calculated 
by  taking the financial statistics, projecting how  many institutions holding 
which types of  assets will fail, and then applying cost ratios to the different 
types of assets. The problem that arose in making cost estimates for thrifts was 
that, as each new  year’s data arrived, the cost ratios were skyrocketing. The 
total assets of failing institutions were in fact relatively stable between 1984 
and 1988-there  were roughly $300 billion of assets held by 600-700  institu- 
tions. The FSLIC could resolve only the worst of them every year, however, 
and, whereas the costs were initially about ten to fifteen cents per dollar, by 
1986 and 1987 the institutions  that they were resolving cost thirty to forty cents 
per dollar. When that is the tip of the iceberg, it is hard to predict the costs for 
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In a way, this is a problem still faced by  the Resolution Trust Corporation 
today, as many of  the assets that it considers are undeveloped properties or 
partially completed buildings. It is impossible to determine their net worth. 
William Taylor expanded on Litan’s explanation. In his experience  doing cost 
estimates with the Federal Reserve staff, they had found that, if one strips out 
the accounting devices, such as deferred losses and goodwill, and then sums 
the resulting net worth over all institutions for which the number is negative, 
one gets a figure of approximately $30 billion. That is, before any assets are 
discounted, the cost is already about $30 billion. When the discounting is ap- 
plied, the numbers  just go up. 
Martin Feldstein posed the question of why the administration  chose to op- 
pose  legislation that would have  restricted insurance on brokered deposits 
since that decision clearly contributed to the growth of  thrifts in the second 
half of the 1980s. 
Isaac said that the administration claimed that it was in favor of brokered 
funds because they allowed markets to work by letting money be transported 
around the country more freely. The real reason may have been the political 
pressure being applied by  Merrill Lynch and other major houses that were 
making a lot of money on brokered funds. In the midst of the battle over this 
legislation, a senior official at Merrill Lynch had said to Isaac, “What kind of 
reaction did you expect you were going to get from us? This is a ‘no brainer’ 
business: we go around the country sweeping up the money, putting it in insti- 
tutions. No risk, no effort, and we’re making $30 million a year. And you 
expect that we’re going to lie down and play dead when you decide you don’t 
like that anymore?’ That was almost a verbatim quote, Isaac said. 
In keeping with the market-oriented style of  the Reagan administration, 
Isaac had suggested that they remove the federal subsidy from the brokered 
funds market-money  brokers should put money into institutions that they 
believed would pay it back without the benefit of a federal guarantee. The ad- 
ministration did not accept Isaac’s argument, and the legislation was defeated. 
Had the subsidy been removed, the savings and loan loss might have been 
much less; as a rough estimate, the money brokers’ continued business prob- 
ably cost the government about $50 billion. 
Taylor suggested that the problem was even wider than brokered deposits. 
Some banks sent people to metropolitan areas all over the country, where they 
would run advertisements encouraging  people to come to a designated location 
and receive insured deposits paying well above the market rates. Thus, there 
were many egregious transactions that were not handled through brokers. 
William Poole noted that there are some reasonable uses of brokering and 
that it is difficult to write legislation that distinguishes the improper uses from 
the proper ones. Also, it is very easy for a brokerage firm to accomplish the 
same thing in a different way if it is proscribed from direct brokering activity. 
The emphasis on brokered funds is entirely misplaced because it is so easy to 
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Isaac agreed that there are other ways to raise funds but argued that brokered 
funds were, by far, the most egregious form of abuse. It does not make sense 
to knock down a rule that is correcting 90 percent of the abuse out of fear that 
there might be 10 percent leakage anyway. Poole concurred but held that, if 
the rule had been passed, people would have immediately shifted to the indirect 
methods for raising funds. Isaac responded that he did not doubt the ingenuity 
of markets to find ways to get around the government or to take advantage of 
subsidies. Had these indirect methods become a significant problem, he would 
have found a way to deal with that, but he had wanted simply to handle the 90 
percent portion of the problem first. 
Litan agreed with Taylor’s point that brokered deposits were more a symp- 
tom than the underlying problem. The underlying problem was growth. Isaac 
said that he had constrained the growth of savings institutions that were insured 
by the FDIC and had coordinated the broker deposit rule with Ed Gray [chair- 
man of  the Federal Home Loan Bank Board]. Had they considered simply 
imposing a growth restriction in lieu of a brokered deposit rule? 
Isaac answered that the FDIC had been reasonably vigilant about trying to 
contain growth. Growth restrictions are generally applied, however, to institu- 
tions that are already in trouble. The regulators issue a cease-and-desist order 
telling them not to grow, and, if they do, they can be fined or punished in some 
other way. But the problem with brokered deposits is that they can grow very, 
very fast. The money brokers were going to institutions that did not have prob- 
lems and dumping hundreds of millions of dollars of funds into them virtually 
overnight. Suddenly, a good institution would have problems, and it was too 
late to stop it with simple growth restrictions: the growth had already occurred. 
Generally, one would need “ten times as many bank examiners” as they had to 
control that kind of growth with regulation. 
Feldstein asked whether Congress had not thought that growth was the de- 
sired solution to the problem? 
Taylor noted that, during 1984 and 1985, the growth rates at some savings 
and loans were fantastically large. A 20 percent growth rate in the assets of a 
bank or financial institution is very difficult to absorb, and 100 percent is un- 
thought of, bct they saw some growth rates of 2,300 percent. To use the funds, 
these banks were frantically seeking real estate investments, and, even though 
many of these investments were called “loans,” they were really straight equity 
investments in real estate. 
Thomas Enders asked whether the federal insurance agencies had consid- 
ered how insurance should be priced and whether they believed that the price 
adequately reflected the overall risk. 
Taylor believed that the issue had not received much consideration. The 
change from insuring $40,000 per account to insuring $100,000 per account 
received very little debate overall, and he remembered no discussion about 
pricing. 
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had focused on risk-based premiums: charging riskier banks more rather than 
raising the overall level of the premium. Ninety percent of bankers favored this 
policy in principle, but there was no consensus on how such a system should 
be implemented. 
On the question of the overall level of premiums, the FDIC had not believed 
that deposit insurance coverage was underpriced. There seemed to be enough 
premium income to deal with the problems that arose. Isaac believed that one 
reason that the FDIC is running short of money now is that they are not hand- 
ling failures as efficiently as they should. In 1984,  the FDIC had handled Con- 
tinental Illinois’s $40 billion failure with an $800 million expenditure; the way 
that failures are being resolved now, a $40 billion failure would probably cost 
the FDIC $4 or $5 billion. Another reason that the FDIC is running short of 
money is the aftereffects of the savings and loan crisis. Many real estate loans 
that went sour for commercial banks did so because so much overbuilding had 
been funded by poorly run savings and loans. 
Feldstein asked Isaac to speak about the Continental Illinois decision. How 
is the decision made that a bank is “too big to fail”? 
Isaac said that the decision was both abhorrent and the right thing to do 
under the circumstances. He gave three explanations for the decision to save 
Continental. The first was the likely repercussions on the savings and loan 
industry. If  Continental had failed, several large thrifts would have fallen with 
it, the FSLIC would have toppled immediately, and the entire thrift industry 
might have collapsed. In retrospect, a collapse in 1984 might have cost $20 
billion to clean up instead of the $200 billion six or seven years later, but no 
one dreamed that the problem would reach this scale. Second, several other 
large banks were in trouble as well. There would have been chaos throughout 
the banking system and a number of big bank failures had Continental failed, 
and the FDIC did not have the money or the people to handle that. A third 
reason was that 2,500 small banks in the Midwest carried over $6 billion in 
uninsured deposits at Continental, so the chaos following a Continental col- 
lapse would have extended quite widely. 
But, although the Continental Illinois decision seemed right to Isaac at the 
time, he continued to believe that “too big to fail” is an inappropriate concept. 
The notion can be avoided if the country develops rules that impose discipline 
on the financial system in advance of crisis. 
Taylor agreed with the decision to save Continental Illinois, but he believed 
that it could have been done in such a way as to avoid spreading the doctrine 
of  “too big to fail,” The rescue had started as a managed liquidation, but then 
the government essentially became the owner. It would have been much better 
had the liquidation been continued until the assets were reduced to a fairly 
insignificant  level and then this residue been sold to another party. Taylor added 
that the decision to bail out the holding company’s creditors had actually saved 
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were clearly greater than its liabilities. By bailing out the creditors, this extra 
value went to the FDIC, not to the creditors. 
Poole suggested that the risk of bank runs makes the notion of “too big to 
fail” a sensible one for large banks. Although these banks might behave with 
more discipline if they thought that they  would be allowed to fail, even the 
most disciplined bank has a lot of short-dated liabilities and can run into un- 
foreseeable problems. Allowing uninsured depositors to lose their deposits 
does not get to the problem of disruption of the overall monetary system. So a 
policy of letting large banks fail poses too big a risk to the system to be very 
credible in advance. 
Poole argued that deposit insurance should be extended to all liabilities 
called deposits but that there should also be more uninsured capital at banks, 
particularly long-dated capital such as equity or ten-year subordinated notes. 
Isaac clarified his views of the proper role of insurance: he thought that 
demand accounts should be insured in full and other accounts up to $100,000. 
Deposits greater than $100,000, however, should be exposed to some loss 
when a bank fails; this will not seriously undermine the financial system. If it 
were announced now that this policy will be implemented in five years, bank 
capital ratios would rise substantially, balance sheets would be handled more 
conservatively, and banks would maintain more liquidity. These rules would 
allow the market to do the job of disciplining these institutions. 
Poole noted that, before deposit insurance was instituted, there had been 
recurrent banking panics that involved some of the very largest banks. It is not 
clear why the environment would be permanently different under Isaac’s pol- 
icy; in fact, the whole history of banking since deposit insurance was instituted 
makes it likely that many banks will believe that, when push comes to shove, 
the authorities will not allow them to fail. 
Isaac said that the biggest banking panic was in 1929-33  and that there were 
not a lot of failures at the big banks. Most of the banks that failed were small, 
and deposit insurance was created so that the small depositor would continue 
to do business at uneconomically small banks. The big banks were opposed to 
deposit insurance; they wanted nationwide branching and a restructuring of the 
industry instead. 
William Rhodes observed that most senior bankers have strong opinions to- 
day about the “too big to fail” doctrine but that, when deposit insurance was 
increased to the $100,000 level, most of them were indifferent. That is to say, 
the banking community cares about the issue now but did not focus on it when 
relevant policies were being established several years ago. 
Michael Mussa said that the country has a general problem with letting an 
enterprise fail. This arises not only with the thrifts and with Continental and 
other banks but also with the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. When a 
firm  that has a pension plan gets in trouble and can no longer make the pay- 
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ance premiums-an  insane way to run an insurance system in Mussa’s view. 
The same rationale prevented effective action on the thrifts at an earlier time, 
and it is a difficulty that we have with all the disguised liabilities of the govern- 
ment. It is tough to decide just to kill an institution off. 
Taylor closed by  saying that the government’s will should be strengthened 
to kill off these organizations. It may not be possible to do so at the expense 
of the depositors, but, if a firm cannot survive in the marketplace, it should be 
taken out of the marketplace. 